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Preventing Opioid Misuse with
Prescription Drug Monitoring Programs:
A Framework for Evaluating the Success
of State Public Health Laws
Rebecca L. Haffajee*
The United States is in the midst of a prescription opioid overdose and misuse epidemic.
Although many factors have contributed to the escalation of prescription painkiller
misuse, it parallels increases in the supply and prescribing of opioids. Prominent statelevel regulatory interventions, such as the establishment of prescription drug monitoring
programs (“PDMPs”), recognize prescribers as opioid gatekeepers. Prescribers, who are
uniquely situated to distinguish between appropriate use and misuse of opioids, are a
natural target for regulation. PDMPs also target patients who seek to obtain high
volumes of prescription opioids for illicit purposes.
PDMP policies are widespread but heterogeneous, largely uninformed by robust
evidence or a systematic assessment of best practices. Whether these programs
successfully reduce opioid misuse and overdoses remains unclear. As well, PDMPs
present a number of legal and ethical challenges that, along with intervention
effectiveness, warrant careful policymaker consideration going forward. This Article
articulates and synthesizes for the first time key criteria intended to assist state regulators
in dynamically evaluating and justifying PDMPs and other public health laws. The
criteria focus on the legality of the policy, approaches to measure its effectiveness, and
normative considerations that should be factored into good laws. Such a framework is
crucial for policymakers given the complexities and magnitude of this public health
challenge, the rich arsenal of policy options from which to choose, and the slow and
uncertain progress in combating prescription painkiller misuse. Concluding
recommendations include implementing PDMPs with the following features: timely and
complete data, strong incentives for prescriber participation, user guidelines and
education, integration into clinical work flow, and robust confidentiality and privacy
protections. Ongoing evaluation of programs to identify features appropriate for
retention and replication is also crucial if PDMPs are to fulfill their potential to curb
prescription opioid overdose and misuse.

* Rebecca L. Haffajee, J.D./M.P.H., graduated from Harvard Law School and Harvard School
of Public Health in 2006. She practiced regulatory health care law and is currently a doctoral candidate
in the Ph.D. Program in Health Policy (Evaluative Science and Statistics concentration), Graduate
School of Arts and Sciences, Harvard University (anticipated 2016). For their highly insightful and
thoughtful comments and feedback in developing this Article, the Author would like to thank
Michelle Mello, Glenn Cohen, Frank Wharam, Alan Zaslavsky, and James Drabick.

[1621]

HAFFAJEE_19 (LANGONE) (Do Not Delete)

1622

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

9/8/2016 4:34 PM

[Vol. 67:1621

Table of Contents
Introduction.............................................................................................. 1622
I. Prescription Drug Misuse: A Public Health Epidemic ................ 1626
A. The Liberalization of Opioid Prescribing for Pain ........ 1627
B. The Rise of Prescription Painkiller Misuse .................... 1629
C. Regulatory Responses ......................................................... 1631
1. State PDMPs ...................................................................... 1634
II. A Framework for Evaluating PDMP Success ............................. 1637
A. Legal Powers to Regulate .................................................. 1644
1. Federalism and the Power to Regulate the Public’s
Health ................................................................................. 1644
2. State and Federal Authority to Monitor Prescription
Drugs .................................................................................. 1647
3. Constitutional Limits on Public Health Regulation ....... 1651
4. Liberty Issues Raised by PDMPs..................................... 1654
B. Effectiveness of Regulation .............................................. 1663
1. Outcome Variables of Interest .......................................... 1665
2. Assessing the Evidence ...................................................... 1667
3. PDMP Effectiveness ......................................................... 1672
C. Ethical Considerations ....................................................... 1677
1. Proportionality................................................................... 1679
2. Minimal Infringement ....................................................... 1681
3. Fairness ............................................................................... 1683
4. Public Accountability ........................................................ 1684
Conclusion ................................................................................................ 1685
Appendix Table. Literature Review:
Published Studies of PDMP Effectiveness in Addressing
Opioid Misuse, 1990–2015 ........................................................................ 1688
Introduction
The United States is in the midst of a prescription opioid misuse
crisis. Although only five percent of the world’s population lives here, we
1
consume over eighty percent of the world’s opioid supplies. Drug
overdoses, over half of which are related to prescription drugs, are now
2
the leading cause of injury and death in the United States. In 2014,
opioids were involved in sixty-one percent of drug overdose deaths, or

1. Jane C. Ballantyne & Andrew Kolodny, Preventing Prescription Opioid Abuse: Letter to the
Editor, 313 JAMA 1059, 1059 (2015).
2. Prescription Drug Overdose Data, Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, http://www.cdc.gov/
drugoverdose/data/overdose.html (last visited Aug. 5, 2016).
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28,647 deaths. The crisis has escalated to such levels over the past two
decades that federal officials now characterize prescription drug misuse
4
and overdose as a national “epidemic.”
Prescription opioid deaths are a consequence of nonmedically
indicated use of opioids. This practice, also termed prescription opioid
misuse and abuse (this Article uses the term “misuses to capture both),
consists of the unintentional or intentional use of medication without a
prescription, in a manner other than as prescribed, or for the feeling or
5
experience it causes. The prevalence of prescription opioid misuse is
striking. In 2013 alone, 15.3 million Americans aged twelve and older
used prescription drugs nonmedically, and 6.5 million had done so in the
6
prior month. Moreover, prescription opioids may serve as gateway
drugs. There is some evidence that addicts switch to even deadlier
substances, such as heroin, when they can no longer access, afford, or
7
tamper with prescription painkillers.
The rise in prescription painkiller misuse is clearly correlated with
the increasing supply and prescribing of opioids. The overall sale of
3. Rose A. Rudd et al., Increases in Drug and Opioid Overdose DeathsUnited States, 2000–2014,
64 Morbidity & Mortality Wkly. Rep. 1378, 1379 (2016) (finding that oxycodone and hydrocodone, the
most commonly prescribed opioid pain relievers, are involved in more overdose deaths than any other
type of opioid, including heroin). See Margaret Warner et al., U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs.,
Drug Poisoning Deaths in the United States, 1980–2008, 1 (2011); Li H. Chen et al., Nat’l Ctr. for
Health Statistics, Drug-Poisoning Deaths Involving Opioid Analgesics: United States, 1999–2011,
1 (2014) (specifying that misuse or abuse of prescription drugs is responsible for much of the recent
increase in drug-poisoning deaths).
4. Leonard Paulozzi et al., CDC Grand Rounds: Prescription Drug OverdosesA U.S. Epidemic,
61 Morbidity & Mortality Wkly. Rep. 10, 10 (2012) (characterizing prescription drug misuse as “the
fastest growing drug problem in the United States” and prescription drug overdose as “a U.S.
Epidemic”); Exec. Office of the President, Epidemic: Responding to America’s Prescription Drug
Abuse Crisis 1 (2011) (calling the prescription drug misuse crisis an “epidemic”).
5. Prescription Drug Misuse and Abuse, Substance Abuse & Mental Health Servs. Admin.,
http://www.samhsa.gov/prescription-drug-misuse-abuse (last visited Aug. 5, 2016).
6. Substance Abuse & Mental Health Servs. Admin., Results from the 2013 National
Survey on Drug Use and Health: Summary of National Findings (2014).
7. See Ian Frazier, The Antidote: Can Staten Island’s Middle-Class Neighborhoods Defeat an Overdose
Epidemic?, The New Yorker (Sept. 8, 2014), http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/09/08/antidote;
Richard C. Dart et al., Trends in Opioid Analgesic Abuse and Mortality in the United States, 372 New
Eng. J. Med. 241, 245–47; Theodore J. Cicero & Matthew S. Ellis, JAMA Psychiatry, AbuseDeterrent Formulations and the Prescription Opioid Abuse Epidemic in the United States:
Lessons Learned from OxyContin (2015). But see Rose A. Rudd et al., Increases in Heroin Overdose
Deaths28 States, 2010 to 2012, 63 Morbidity & Mortality Wkly. Rep. 849, 852 (2014) (“[a]lthough
some persons might be discontinuing prescription opioids and initiating heroin use as a replacement,
results from this study indicate that recent heroin death rate increases were not significantly associated
with decreases in [opioid pain reliever] overdose mortality.”); Wilson M. Compton et al., Relationship
Between Nonmedical Prescription-Opioid Use and Heroin Use, 374 New Eng. J. Med. 154, 154–61
(2016) (finding that although a subgroup of nonmedical prescription opioid users may transition to
heroin useespecially those persons with frequent nonmedical use and those with opioid misuse or
dependencethe timing of policy-driven efforts to curb prescription opioid availability (which
predated the increase in the rates of heroin use) makes it unlikely that the policies induced a
substitution effect to heroin use).
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opioid analgesic painkillers, which increased nearly four-fold between 1999
through 2010, parallels observed increases in opioid-related overdose
8
deaths, emergency department visits, and treatment admissions. In 2012
alone, providers issued 259 million opioid prescriptionsenough for every
9
adult to have their own bottle of pills.
A heightened focus on pain management starting in the 1990s
10
liberalized opioid prescribing. But in responding to the public health
problem of under-treatment of pain, prescribers paradoxically have played
a major role in creating another public health problem: the growth of
prescription drug misuse. Twenty-five percent of nonmedical prescription
painkiller users obtained their drugs directly from a doctor’s prescription,
while seventy percent of users accessed drugs from family or
friendsalmost ninety percent of whom had gotten their prescription from
11
a doctor). In other words, the vast majority of misused prescription drugs
12
are sourced directly or indirectly from prescribers.
Prescribers are uniquely situated to distinguish between appropriate
use and misuse of opioids and prescribe accordingly. Several state regulatory
interventionsmost prominently, the establishment of prescription drug
monitoring programs (“PDMPs”)recognize prescribers as opioid
13
gatekeepers. PDMPs also target “doctor shoppers” (patients with
particularly high opioid consumption patterns), and diverters (individuals
who transfer their prescribed drugs to others for illicit use). PDMPs have
been adopted in all but one state, and the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention describes them as “among the most promising state-level

8. Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Vital Signs: Overdoses of Prescription Opioid Pain
RelieversUnited States, 1999–2008, 60 Morbidity & Mortality Wkly. Rep. 1487, 1488–91 (2011).
9. Christopher M. Jones et al., Sources of Prescription Opioid Pain Relievers by Frequency of
Past-Year Nonmedical Use: United States, 2008-2011, 174 JAMA Internal Med. 802, 802–03 (2014);
Leonard J. Paulozzi et al., Vital Signs: Variation Among States in Prescribing of Opioid Pain Relievers
and BenzodiazepinesUnited States, 2012, 63 Morbidity & Mortality Wkly. Rep. 563 (2014).
10. Andrea M. Garcia, State Laws Regulating Prescribing of Controlled Substances: Balancing the
Public Health Problems of Chronic Pain and Prescription Painkiller Abuse and Overdose, 41 J.L. Med. &
Ethics (Supp.) 42, 42–43 (2013); Tatyana Lyapustina & G. Caleb Alexander, The Prescription Opioid
Addiction and Abuse Epidemic: How it Happened and What We Can Do About It, The Pharmaceutical
J. (2015), http://www.pharmaceutical-journal.com/opinion/comment/the-prescription-opioid-addictionand-abuse-epidemic-how-it-happened-and-what-we-can-do-about-it/20068579.article (discussing the rise
in global prescribing of opioids for pain starting in the 1990s, and claiming that the increased morbidity
and mortality from opioids has resulted from the degree to which they have been prescribed).
11. Substance Abuse & Mental Health Servs. Admin., supra note 6.
12. See Jones et al., supra note 9, at 802–03 (observing that those at highest risk of overdose, or
those who use prescription opioids nonmedically on a chronic basis (that is, for 200 or more days per
year), were at the highest risk to obtain their drugs directly from a doctor (twenty-seven percent of the
time)).
13. See Barath Chakravarthy et al., Prescription Drug Monitoring Programs and Other
Interventions to Combat Prescription Opioid Abuse, 13 W. J. Emergency Med. 422, 424 (2012).
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interventions to improve opioid prescribing, inform clinical practice, and
14
protect patients at risk.”
Although early evidence is emerging regarding the impact of these
interventions on opioid prescribing, misuse, and overdoses, the rapid
proliferation of heterogeneous PDMPs has been largely uninformed by
robust evidence or a systematic assessment of best practices. Instead,
state replication of PDMPs has exemplified disorganized policymaking in
the face of a serious public health crisis. Moreover, PDMPs present a
number of legal and normative challenges that, along with intervention
effectiveness, warrant careful policymaker consideration going forward.
Thus, existing PDMPs offer an opportunity to reflect upon how state
public health policymaking in this area can follow a more deliberate path
towards success.
This Article argues for the use of state PDMPs with the following
features: timely and complete data; strong incentives for prescriber
participation; user guidelines and education; integration into clinical
workflow; and strong confidentiality protectionsincluding a requirement
that law enforcement officials and licensing boards access individualidentifying data only with a court-issued warrant or subpoena. Ongoing
evaluation of PDMPs to improve understanding of best practices is also
needed. To arrive at these recommendations, this Article articulates and
synthesizes, for the first time, key criteria intended to assist state regulators
in dynamically evaluating and potentially justifying public health laws. The
criteria focus on the following: (1) the form that regulation should take
based on analysis of the policy’s legality; (2) measurement of law
effectiveness; and (3) normative considerations that ought to be factored
into good public health policy. Such a streamlined framework is a critical
tool for state regulators, given the complexities and scope of prescription
opioid misuse, the rich arsenal of policy options available to address it, and
slow and uncertain progress in combating this problem. Although used to
guide PDMP policymaking, this framework also can be applied to
interventions designed to address public health threats that exhibit similar
characteristics to prescription drug misusethat is, those of significant
magnitude and that may be addressed using a number of available policy
15
options, the success of which is not yet obvious or common knowledge.

14. Prescription Drug Monitoring Programs (PDMPs), Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention
(May 5, 2015), http://www.cdc.gov/drugoverdose/pdmp/index.html (last visited Aug. 5, 2016).
15. The framework may also be used after identifying “critical opportunities” for public health
lawmaking, or areas “in which law is under-performing as a public health tool in relation to the problem
of interest.” Law can under-perform because legal interventions are few (or nonexistent) or because they
are executing poorly, such as causing undesirable consequences. A critical opportunity satisfies three
criteria: (1) it targets a significant public health threat; (2) its etiology is well-understood to support the
use of law as an intervention; and (3) one or more plausible legal interventions are available to address
the threat but are not being used to their full advantage. Michelle M. Mello et al., Critical Opportunities
for Public Health Law: A Call for Action, 103 Am. J. Pub. Health 1979, 1979–80 (2013).
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This Article proceeds as follows. Part I describes the current
prescription drug misuse crisis, establishing it as a public health threat of
substantial magnitude that evolved from a history of ebbing and flowing
in opioid prescribing in the United States. Part I also outlines the panoply
of regulatory interventions available to address this epidemic, including,
most prominently, PDMPs implemented by state governments. Part II
then lays out a framework for evaluating public health laws implemented
by the states, which bear great responsibility to protect population health,
and applies it to PDMPs. Key criteria are articulated that probe legal
powers to regulate (including legal barriers to implementation), the
effectiveness of the law at achieving identified primary and secondary
health outcomes, and salient ethical issues raised by public health
regulation. Finally, specific recommendations for PDMPs, generated by
application of the evaluative framework, are set forth, with the goal of
maximizing the chances that these policies will be a public health success.
I. Prescription Drug Misuse: A Public Health Epidemic
The current prescription drug misuse and overdose epidemic
evolved from over a century of ebbing and flowing in prescription drug
use in America. This is the third wave of misuse, following two earlier
16
eras of problematic opioid use and regulatory responses. The first
escalation in misuse occurred in the late 19th century during a time when
17
opioids were altogether unregulated. Opioids, including heroin, were
commonly prescribed for menstrual pain, among other maladies, often
18
resulting in iatrogenic morphine addiction. Regulation ensued, in the
form of the 1906 Pure Food and Drug Act, which required the content of
drugs (including opioids) to be listed on their labels, and the 1914
Harrison Narcotics Act, which regulated physicians by mandating that
they write prescriptions for opioids, taxing them for such prescriptions,
19
and requiring that they maintain records of drugs dispensed. The Act
also restricted the quantity of opiates that could be contained in
20
medicines. Regulation and increased medical education and treatment
21
options, had the intended effect of reducing opioid overprescribing.

16. Austin Frakt, Painkiller Abuse, a Cyclical Challenge, N.Y. Times (Dec. 22, 2014), http://www.
nytimes.com/2014/12/23/upshot/painkiller-abuse-a-cyclical-challenge.html?abt=0002&abg=1&_r=0.
17. Id.
18. Id.; Andrew Kolodny et al., The Prescription Opioid and Heroin Crisis: A Public Health
Approach to an Epidemic of Addiction, 36 Ann. Rev. Pub. Health 559, 561 (2015) (discussing the
limited options, other than opium and morphine, available to physicians in this era when treating pain
symptoms).
19. Id.; Ellen M. Weber, Failure of Physicians to Prescribe Pharmacotherapies for Addiction:
Regulatory Restrictions and Physician Resistance, 13 J. Health Care L. & Pol’y 49, 57 (2010).
20. Weber, supra note 19, at 57.
21. Kolodny et al., supra note 18, at 562.
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The second wave of misuse came in the mid-1950s, as reports of
increases in opioid use and overdose deaths proliferated across the
22
country. Regulatory responses included laws permitting involuntary
hospitalizations of addicts, the establishment of methadone clinics for
treating addiction under the Controlled Substances Act (“CSA”), and
formation of the Drug Enforcement Administration (“DEA”) to
23
coordinate federal anti-drug efforts.
In the decades after this second wave, the under-treatment of pain
was increasingly recognized as a serious public health challenge that
necessitated changes to prescribing behavior. The United Nations even
24
declared access to pain medication a human right in 1961. This swing
toward the liberalization of opioid prescribing contributed substantially to
the current misuse and overdose epidemic. In response, various
stakeholdersincluding state and federal regulators, insurers, drug
manufacturers, and providershave adopted a panoply of interventions
targeting the supply of, demand for, and misuse of opioids.
A. The Liberalization of Opioid Prescribing for Pain
Under-treatment of pain is itself a serious public health challenge in
the United States. An Institute of Medicine committee estimated that
every year chronic pain affects about 100 million people and costs up to
25
$560–635 billion in lost productivity and medical treatment. Starting in
the 1980s, inadequate treatment of chronic pain received heightened
scrutiny. Before this time, physicians prescribed narcotics for short-term,
26
acute pain, or for pain related to cancer or end-of-life care. Two medical
journal articlesthe first published in 1980 in the New England Journal
of Medicine, and the second in Pain in 1986opened the door to more
27
liberal prescribing of painkillers. Both studies concluded that narcotics
can be safely prescribed for chronic pain to many patients with little risk
28
of inducing addiction.
In 1995, Purdue Pharma introduced an extended-release, highly
potent form of the painkiller oxycodone, known as OxyContin, which
29
marked the onset of increased opioid use. Around the same time, drug
manufacturers began to market their opioid drugs for chronic, non22. Frakt, supra note 16.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Inst. of Med. of the Nat’l Acads., Relieving Pain in America: A Blueprint for
Transforming Prevention, Care, Education, and Research (2011). The Institute of Medicine is now
known as the National Academy of Sciences.
26. Celine Gounder, Who is Responsible for the Pain-Pill Epidemic?, The New Yorker (Nov. 8, 2013),
http://www.newyorker.com/business/currency/who-is-responsible-for-the-pain-pill-epidemic.
27. Id.; Frakt, supra note 16.
28. Id.
29. Kolodny et al., supra note 18, at 562.
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cancer pain via advertisements in well-respected journals, through
continuing medical education courses for doctors, and by contributing
financial support to not-for-profit organizations, such as the American
Academy of Pain Management, the American Pain Society, and the
30
Federation of State Medical Boards. Highly-regarded physicianssuch
as Dr. Russell Portenoy, co-author of the Pain study and director of the
American Pain Societyserved as the faces behind many of these drug
31
company promotions. In 1996, the American Pain Society launched an
aggressive campaign entitled “Pain as the Fifth Vital Sign,” the message
of which was embraced by the Veterans Affairs health system and The
Joint Commission, which accredits health care organizations, including
32
hospitals. In 2004, the Federation of State Medical Boards passed a
33
model policy on the use of controlled substances to treat pain. The
policy encouraged state medical boards to consider under-treatment of
pain an equally serious violation of the standard of care as over34
treatment.
Additionally, over the past several decades, more subtle forces have
encouraged doctors to generously prescribe opioids. Patient satisfaction
assessments pervade the modern practice of medicine (and even impact
payment under pay-for-performance schemes), thereby motivating
35
certain physicians to prescribe opioids if requested by patients. The
medical insurer practice of reimbursing well for prescription pain
medications further reinforces the use of opioids to treat subjective
36
pain. Cumulatively, stakeholder group activities, financial incentives,
and patient satisfaction considerations contributed significantly to sharp
increases in opioid prescribing observed in the 1990s–2000s and laid the
foundations for misuse.
During this same period, a number of academics proposed legal
strategies to promote opioid prescribing for pain. Building upon one
prominent case in which a California court found a physician to have
committed elder abuse by failing to prescribe drugs adequately to manage
37
a patient’s pain, some academics advocated for increased state court
recognition of tort claims against physicians who under-prescribe

30. Id.; Frakt, supra note 16.
31. Gounder, supra note 26.
32. Kolodny et al., supra note 18, at 562.
33. Garcia, supra note 10, at 43.
34. Id.; Gounder, supra note 26.
35. Anna Lembke, Why Doctors Prescribe Opioids to Known Opioid Abusers, 367 New Eng. J.
Med. 1580, 1580–81 (2012).
36. Id.; Aleksandra Zgierska et al., Patient Satisfaction, Prescription Drug Abuse, and Potential
Unintended Consequences, 307 JAMA 1377, 1377–78 (2012).
37. Garcia, supra note 10, at 42–43.
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38

painkillers or institutions that fail to satisfy a standard of care for effective
39
pain relief. Others have recommended the development of a
comprehensive, coordinated, national policy to address the inadequate
management of pain, rather than the patchwork of state and federal
40
policies in existence. Still others have questioned the appropriateness of
criminal liability for prescribers under the CSA and instead supported an
increased role for state medical boards in policing physician controlled
41
substance prescribing. Many of these viewpoints, however, relied on
older science that supported the effectiveness of opioids for treating
chronic, non-cancer paina clinical viewpoint that is now regularly
42
challenged and up for debate. Concerns with under-prescribing now must
be balanced with those about over-prescribing, given our current epidemic
of prescription drug misuse.
B. The Rise of Prescription Painkiller Misuse
Prescription opioid misuse in the United States has risen to
43
epidemic proportions in recent years. Nonmedical use of prescription
drugs occurs in four therapeutic classes (pain relievers, tranquilizers,
stimulants, and sedatives); opioid pain relievers, however, are the most
44
commonly misused medication by far. The percentage of Americans
aged twenty and older who nonmedically use pain relievers in a month
has held relatively stable at around seven percent over the past decade,
45
after increasing from five percent between 1999–2002. However, this
statistic fails to capture an increase in the intensity of use and misuse. For

38. See Michael J. Reynolds, Morphine or Malpractice: Should Courts Recognize a Legal Duty to
Prescribe Opiates for Treating Chronic Pain, 15 J. C.R. & Econ. Dev. 79 (2000); Barry R. Furrow, Pain
Management and Provider Liability: No More Excuses, 29 J.L. Med. & Ethics 28, 30–36 (2001); Gilah
R. Mayer, Comment, Bergman v. Chin: Why an Elder Abuse Case Is a Stride in the Direction of Civil
Culpability for Physicians Who Undertreat Patients Suffering from Terminal Pain, 37 New Eng. L.
Rev. 313 (2003).
39. Furrow, supra note 38, at 37–42; Ben A. Rich, The Politics of Pain: Rhetoric or Reform?, 8 DePaul
J. Health Care L. 519, 542 (2005).
40. Amy J. Dilcher, Damned If They Do, Damned If They Don’t: The Need for a Comprehensive
Public Policy to Address the Inadequate Management of Pain, 13 Annals Health L. 81, 135 (2004).
41. Diane E. Hoffmann & Anita J. Tarzian, Achieving the Right Balance in Oversight of Physician
Opioid Prescribing for Pain: The Role of State Medical Boards, 31 J.L. Med. & Ethics 21, 22 (2003);
Diane E. Hoffmann, Treating Pain v. Reducing Drug Diversion and Abuse: Recalibrating the Balance
in Our Drug Control Laws and Policies, 1 St. Louis J. Health L. & Pol’y 231 (2008).
42. See Nat’l Insts. of Health, Pathways to Prevention: The Role of Opioids in the
Treatment of Chronic Pain 35 (2014) (suggesting that for most patients, there are likely to be more
effective approaches to managing chronic pain than opioid therapies).
43. For a definition of “nonmedical use,” see State Estimates of Nonmedical Use of Prescription Pain
Relievers, Nat’l Survey on Drug Use & Health (Jan. 8, 2013), http://www.samhsa.gov/data/sites/default/
files/NSDUH115/NSDUH115/sr115-nonmedical-use-pain-relievers.htm.
44. Substance Abuse & Mental Health Servs. Admin., supra note 6, at 15–18.
45. Steven M. Frenk et al., Prescription Opioid Analgesic Use Among Adults: United
States, 1999–2012 1–2 (2015).
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example, from 1999–2002 to 2011–2012, the percentage of opioid
analgesic users who used a stronger-than-morphine equivalent opioid
(per dose) in the past thirty days increased from seventeen percent to
46
thirty-seven percent.
Moreover, adverse health consequences resulting from prescription
drug misuseincluding overdose events, emergency department (“ED”)
visits, and inpatient admissionshave escalated dramatically. Fatal opioid
overdoses exploded from 1.4 per 100,000 people in 1999 to 9.0 per 100,000
47
people in 2014. The rate of emergency department visits involving
nonmedical use of prescription drugsprimarily of opioidsmore than
48
doubled from 214 visits per 100,000 people in 2004 to 458 in 2011. About
half of these deaths and ED visits also involved at least one other drug,
49
including benzodiazepines, cocaine, or heroin. The proportion of
substance abuse treatment admissions citing pain reliever misuse also
50
more than quadrupled from 1998 and 2008.
Prescription opioid use and misuse persists among people from
diverse demographic backgrounds, albeit certain groups exhibit slightly
higher rates of use and overdose risk. Adults aged forty and older are
slightly more likely to use opioid analgesics than adults aged twenty to
thirty-nine; women are slightly more likely than men to use opioids; and
non-Hispanic white adults are more likely to use prescription painkillers
51
than Hispanic adults. People at heightened risk for opioid overdose
include women, those consuming high daily doses of opioids, those
52
taking medication for chronic pain, “doctor-shoppers,” users of multiple
abusable substances, and those with substance abuse or other mental
53
health issues.
46. Id. at 2.
47. Chen et al., supra note 3, at 2; Rudd et al., supra note 3, at 1378.
48. Substance Abuse & Mental Health Servs. Admin., The DAWN Report: Highlights of
the 2011 Drug Abuse Warning Network (DAWN) Findings on Drug-Related Emergency
Department Visits 5 (2013).
49. Id.; Warner et al., supra note 3, at 1.
50. Exec. Office of the President, 2010 National Survey on Drug Use and Health:
Highlights (2011).
51. Frenk et al., supra note 45, at 3–6.
52. Clinical definitions of “doctor shoppers” differ. See Scott G. Weiner et al., Characteristics of
Emergency Department “Doctor Shoppers,” 48 J. Emergency Med. 424, 425 (2014) (defining “doctor
shoppers” as patients that had eight or more Schedule II-V prescriptions filled from eight or more providers
in one year); Douglas C. McDonald & Kenneth E. Carlson, Estimating the Prevalence of Opioid Diversion by
“Doctor Shoppers” in the United States, 8 PLOS ONE 1, (2013) (using different thresholds to define “doctor
shoppers” to estimate opioid diversion prevalence). See Joseph Logan et al., Opioid Prescribing in
Emergency Departments: The Prevalence of Potentially Inappropriate Prescribing and Misuse, 51 Med. Care
646 (2013) (identifying the following as indicators of potential inappropriate use: opioid prescriptions
overlapping by one week or more; overlapping opioid and benzodiazepine prescriptions; high daily doses of
greater than or equal to 100 morphine milligram equivalents; long-acting/extended-release (“LA/ER”)
opioids for acute pain; and overlapping LA/ER opioids).
53. Kate M. Dunn et al., Opioid Prescriptions for Chronic Pain and Overdose: A Cohort Study,
152 Annals Internal Med. 85, 87–91 (2010); Amy S.B. Bohnert et al., Association Between Opioid
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There is little room for optimism. Evidence from 2011–2013 did
54
indicate a leveling off in opioid prescribing rates and overdoses nationally,
which some researchers attributed to the August 2010 reformulation of
55
OxyContin to a more tamper-resistant form. However, more recent
evidence shows that national prescription opioid overdose death rates again
56
significantly increased from 2013–2014, suggesting that existing policy
interventions may not be sufficient to tackle the epidemic. Over this same
period, moreover, heroin abuse rates increased, suggesting that
somethough not allprescription drug misusers switched to an illegal,
cheaper, and deadlier alternative when they could no longer access
57
prescription opioids.
C. Regulatory Responses
Federal and state policymakers, among others, have responded with a
multitude of interventions to address opioid misuse and overdoses. Table 1
catalogues prominent interventions and identifies the stakeholders that
typically take these measures. Although not exhaustive, this list illustrates
the many strategies available and the complex array of implementers. These
strategies are characterized within the public health prevention paradigm
used for epidemiologic responses to other communicable and noncommunicable diseases. Opioid addictioncompulsive opioid seeking and
58
use despite the often negative consequences is the chronic disease that
59
can result from prescription opioid misuse.
Addiction prevention strategies can be organized into categories
that focus on: (1) primary prevention of new cases of opioid addiction; (2)
secondary prevention to identify and treat early cases of addiction; and

Prescribing Patterns and Opioid Overdose-Related Deaths, 305 JAMA 1315, 1315–21 (2011); Alan G.
White et al., Analytic Models to Identify Patients at Risk for Prescription Opioid Abuse, 15 Am. J.
Managed Care 897, 897–906 (2009); B.L. Wilsey et al., Profiling Multiple Provider Prescribing of
Opioids, Benzodiazepines, Stimulants, and Anorectics, 112 Drug & Alcohol Dependence 99 (2010).
See Anupam B. Jena et al., Opioid Prescribing by Multiple Providers in Medicare: Retrospective
Observational Study of Insurance Claims, 348 British Med. J. 1393 (2014) (finding that concurrent
opioid prescribing by multiple providers in Medicare patients is associated with higher rates of opioidrelated hospital admissions).
54. See Dart et al., supra note 7, at 241.
55. Id.; Marc R. Larochelle et al., Rates of Opioid Dispensing and Overdose After Introduction of
Abuse-Deterrent Extended-Release Oxycodone and Withdrawal of Propoxyphene, 175 JAMA
Internal Med. 978 (2015); Cicero & Ellis, supra note 7, at 424.
56. Rudd et al., supra note 3, at 1378–79.
57. Dart et al., supra note 7; Larochelle et al., supra note 55; Brian Owens, Tackling Prescription
Drug Abuse, The Pharmaceutical J. (June 11, 2015), http://www.pharmaceuticaljournal.com/news-andanalysis/features/tackling-prescription-drug-abuse/20068685.article?adfesuccess=1; Compton et al., supra
note 7.
58. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Prescription Drug Abuse 3 (2014). Addiction can
also include physical dependence, or where an individual experiences withdrawal symptoms when use
of a drug is suddenly stopped or reduced. Id.
59. Kolodny et al., supra note 18, at 565.
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(3) tertiary prevention to effectively treat those already addicted. The
goal of primary prevention is to reduce the incidence of diseasein this
case, to prevent the initiation of opioid addiction. Prescriber guidelines
are an example of primary prevention, because they seek to encourage
more informed opioid prescribing. Secondary prevention measures aim
to identify and treat a serious health condition after onset but before
61
serious complications ensue, such as detecting doctor shoppers by
means of a PDMP. Finally, tertiary prevention measures provide therapy
62
and rehabilitation once a disease is firmly established. Access to the
opioid antagonist drugs (such as naloxone) is an example of tertiary
prevention.
Undoubtedly, some combination of these prevention measures is
required to comprehensively address prescription opioid-related morbidity
and mortalitybut which specific interventions are most worthwhile to
pursue? This Article focuses on a specific type of intervention: prescription
drug monitoring programs, which will be referred to as “PDMPs”
throughout. Other prevention measures are unquestionably key
components to comprehensively addressing the epidemic, but PDMPs are
a popular, state-level, legal mechanism that have gained the reputation of
63
having incredible promise for addressing opioid misuse. They primarily
target prescribing, a significant upstream driver of prescription opioid
misuse because it serves as the prerequisite to most opioid
addictionwhether by initial prescription, repeat prescriptions, or obtaining
64
drugs from friends or family members or diverters. And, PDMPs have
experienced widespreadalbeit disorganizedroll-out among the states,
such that policies exhibit widely varying features not rigorously informed by
evidence or systematic criteria for determining their success.

60. Id. at 565–69.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Chakravarthy et al., supra note 13, at 424.
64. Wilson M. Compton et al., Prescription Opioid Abuse: Problems and Responses, 80 Preventive
Med. 5 (2015). See Jones et al., supra note 9, at 802–03 (underscoring the need to target prescribers, as
they commonly source opioids to frequent users).
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Table I. Interventions to Curb Prescription Drug Misuse
Stage

Objective

Primary
prevention

Prevent initiation
of prescription
opioid addiction

Examples of
Interventions
Opioid prescriber
education and
guidelines*

Pain management clinic
66
(“pill mill”) regulation*

Opioid drug approval*

Abuse-deterrent drug
formulations*
Medication take-back or
disposal programs*

Secondary
prevention

Identify and treat
prescription
opioid addiction
after onset but
before serious
complications
develop

Prescription drug
monitoring programs**
Urine testing for drugs**
Drug supply
management **
 Formulary
development
 Quantity limits
 Reimbursement
incentives
Anti-“doctor shopping”
67
laws

Implementing Stakeholders
 State and local
governments
 Health care providers
 Federal government
o U.S. Food and Drug
Administration
(“FDA”): Risk
Evaluation and
Mitigation Strategy
65
(“REMS”) required of
extended-release/longacting (“ER/LA”) opioid
drug sponsors
 State governments
 Federal government
o Drug Enforcement
Agency (“DEA”)
 Federal government
o FDA:REMS required for
ER/LA opioids
 Opioid drug developers
 Federal government
o DEA
 State or local governments
 Retail pharmacies
 State governments
 Insurers
 Health care providers
 Insurers
 Insurers
 Pharmacy benefit
managers

 State and local governments

65. Under the Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act (“FDAAA”) of 2007, REMS
was introduced as a risk-management strategy intended to reduce known or serious safety hazards
associated with a drug or biologic product. The FDAAA grants the FDA authority to require sponsors
to submit a REMS prior to drug approval if it determines that such a measure is necessary to ensure
that drug benefits outweigh risks, or after approval if new safety information emerges to necessitate
such a strategy. Inst. of Med., Ethical & Sci. Issues in Studying the Safety of Approved Drugs 42–
43 (2012). See infra note 152 for a discussion of the REMS for ER/LA opioid medications.
66. “Pill mills” are those facilities where pain management is the primary practice component, or
which provide pain treatment to a majority (greater than fifty percent) of patients, or both. Ctrs. for
Disease Control & Prevention, Menu of Pain Management Clinic Regulation 1 (2012).
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Stage

Objective

Tertiary
prevention

Address firmly
established
opioid addiction
through
therapeutic or
rehabilitative
measures

Examples of
Interventions
Opioid addiction
treatment

Access to opioid
overdose reversal drugs
Syringe exchange
programs

9/8/2016 4:34 PM

[Vol. 67:1621
Implementing Stakeholders
 Insurers
 Health care providers
 Governments (federal,
state, local)
 State and local
governments
 Insurers and PBMs
 State and local
governments
 Non-governmental
organizations

* These interventions can also be considered secondary prevention
measures.
** These interventions could be considered primary, secondary, or tertiary
prevention measures, because they aim to identify either misusers or
diverters and prevent them from accessing opioids (which can then be
passed on to “unexposed” persons) and can be used to direct misusers into
treatment programs.

1.

State PDMPs

State PDMPs are the most prevalent state policy mechanism used to
address prescription drug misuse, with forty-nine states and the District
68
of Columbia having enacted programs. PDMPs digitally store
controlled substance dispensing information in a centralized, statewide
database and make that information accessible to “authorized users,”
including prescribers, pharmacists, and sometimes law enforcement
69
officials and state medical boards. When they query the system about a
patient, authorized users typically see the dose, supply, and prescriber of
70
scheduled drugs that the patient has recently filled. Authorized users
can only access the data with log-in credentials provided upon registering
with the PDMP.
PDMPs seek to satisfy many goals, most prominently to support
providers in facilitating the legitimate medical use of controlled substances,
71
while avoiding prescription drug misuse. Armed with PDMP-supplied
information about a patient, prescribers and pharmacists can communicate
67. “Doctor shopping” is defined as when a patient obtains controlled substances from multiple
healthcare providers without the prescribers’ knowledge of the other prescriptions. Ctrs. for Disease
Control & Prevention, Doctor Shopping Laws 1 (2012).
68. Nat’l All. for Model State Drug Laws, Annual Review of Prescription Monitoring
Programs 2 (2014).
69. Prescription Drug Monitoring Program Ctr. of Excellence at Brandeis, Briefing on
PDMP Effectiveness 3 (2014).
70. Rebecca L. Haffajee et al., Mandatory Use of Prescription Drug Monitoring Programs, 313 JAMA
891 (2015).
71. Kristin Finklea et al., Cong. Research Serv., Prescription Drug Monitoring Programs 3
(2014) (additionally identifying public health trend surveillance as a PDMP purpose).
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with the patient about his or her prescription histories, address potentially
dangerous co-prescribing of substances, refrain from supplying opioids to a
72
doctor shopper or diverter, comfortably provide prescription drugs to an
individual who doesn’t raise concerns about misuse, and direct individuals
73
into substance abuse treatment therapy when clinically indicated. When
enough providers share dispensing information and access patient
profiles via PDMPs, opioid misusers and diverters have a harder time
“gaming” the system by seeking drugs from multiple providers or
pharmacies. As well, PDMPs are intended to help regulators investigate
clinicians with inappropriate prescribing and dispensing patterns as well
74
as patients with drug fill behaviors indicative of misuse or diversion. In
sum, PDMPs aim to improve individual as well as population health, by
improving prescribing and dispensing decisions made for each patient,
and by limiting the negative externalities generated by the over-supply of
75
opioids.
State legislatures create PDMPs by statute and outline program
details by regulation, often leaving many of the operational particulars to
76
the executive agency in which the program is housed. Advances in
information technology facilitated state implementation of electronic
77
PDMPs in the 1990s–2000s. These programs succeeded earlier, lesswidespread paper prescription monitoring systems (also known as carbon
copy or triplicate paper programs), the first of which was created in
78
California in 1939. Since the first electronic PDMP was established in
79
Oklahoma in 1990, these programs have rapidly proliferated. In 2001,
sixteen states had authorized the creation of a program by statute; and by
June 2012, forty-nine states and one territory had passed such laws (with
80
forty-one states having an operational program). Today, every state
81
except Missouri has an operational PDMP.
72. See supra note 52 for clinical definitions of “doctor shoppers.”
73. Haffajee et al., supra note 70, at 891.
74. Finklea et al., supra note 71, at 3.
75. See G. Caleb Alexander et al., Rethinking Opioid Prescribing to Protect Patient Safety and
Public Health, 308 JAMA 1865, 1865–66 (2012) (suggesting that a public health approach to the
treatment of pain calls for greater clinical judiciousness in prescribing of opioids given the harmful
effects that clinicians’ treatment decisions have on other individuals beyond the patient being treated).
76. PDMPs are most commonly housed within health agencies or boards of pharmacy, although
some are housed within law enforcement or other agencies. The housing agency distributes PDMP
data to individuals authorized under state law to receive the information. Richard A. Deyo et al.,
Measures Such as Interstate Cooperation Would Improve the Efficacy of Programs to Track Controlled
Drug Prescriptions, 32 Health Aff. 603, 604 (2013).
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Thomas Clark et al., Prescription Drug Monitoring Programs: An Assessment of the
Evidence for Best Practices 3, The Prescription Drug Monitoring Program Ctr. of Excellence,
Brandeis Univ. (2012).
80. Id. at 5.
81. Nat’l All. for Model State Drug Laws, supra note 68, at 2.
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PDMPs vary widely along a number of dimensions, including: who
83
can query the data (and for what purposes); whether unsolicited reports
84
are sent to users; whether prescribers and/or dispensers can delegate
85
access to an authorized agent; whether notification of a patient is
86
required when his/her data is accessed; the extent to which data is
87
88
shared with other states; how frequently the data is updated; and
89
whether training is required for users. PDMPs increasingly monitor (or
track) drugs that are included in Schedules II through V of the DEA’s
90
controlled substances schedules. Recent innovations gaining traction
with states include mandates that clinicians query the data for
91
information regarding a patient, under specified circumstances. Also on
the PDMP policy horizon is the integration of PDMP data into clinical

82. See id. for an updated comparison of program features. See generally Deyo et al., supra note
76, at 605–07 (describing the variations in program design and controversies surrounding prescription
drug monitoring programs).
83. Forty-eight states include prescribers, dispensers, licensing boards, and law enforcement
officials as “authorized users.” Only eighteen states require law enforcement to access the data only
with a warrant, subpoena, or other judicial process, whereas thirty states allow such access pursuant
merely to an active investigation. Nat’l All. for Model State Drug Laws, supra note 68, at 25–26,
31.
84. Forty-five states send unsolicited reports to individuals varying from prescribers, to law
enforcement officials, to licensing officials. The triggers for and information included in these reports
vary widely. Id. at 45.
85. In thirty-four states, prescribers and/or dispensers can delegate access to an agent who can log
into the system on their behalf. Agents can include a physician’s assistant, nurse practitioner,
pharmacy technician, or other health personnel. Id. at 21.
86. Patients must be notified when their PDMP data is accessed in eleven states. Id. at 9.
87. Although forty-five states have authorized interstate data sharing, only thirty-two states currently
share data. Id. at 34; Interstate Data Sharing, Prescription Drug Monitoring Program Training & Tech.
Assistance Ctr. (Aug. 2015), http://www.pdmpassist.org/pdf/Interstate_Data_Sharing.pdf (last visited Aug.
5, 2016).
88. Over half of state PDMPs update the data weekly or less frequently, while only one program
offers real-time data. Nat’l All. for Model State Drug Laws, supra note 68, at 12–13.
89. PDMP training is required of authorized users in only thirteen states, although most states
offer optional training. Id. at 36.
90. Schedule I drugs have high misuse potential and are not prescribed legally (they currently
have no medically accepted use in the United States)thus, drugs such as heroin or ecstasy cannot be
tracked. Schedule II drugs are those with a high potential for misuse but a medically accepted use,
such as oxycodone, morphine, and stimulants. Schedule III drugs are those with moderate misuse
potential and a medically accepted use, such as buprenorphine. Schedule IV drugs are those with low
misuse potential and a medically accepted use, such as benzodiazepines and hypnotics. Finally,
Schedule V drugs are those with the lowest potential for misuse and a medically accepted use, such as
cough syrups with codeine and anti-diarrheals. Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. § 801 (West
2016).
91. Nat’l All. for Model State Drug Laws, supra note 68, at 3, 40 (identifying twenty-four
states as having some form of mandate, although conditions and exemptions vary widely). See
Haffajee et al., supra note 70, at 891–92 (outlining the pros and cons of requiring prescribers to
participate in querying PDMP systems, and arguing that while mandates may be called for, given the
magnitude of prescription drug misuse and early indications of mandate effectiveness, more robust
evidence and guidelines to support their implementation are necessary to avoid potentially dire
unintended consequencessuch as under-prescribing of opioids for legitimate pain).
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workflow (such as electronic medical records) and improved interstate
sharing of data to track those individuals who travel across state lines in
92
pursuit of prescription drugs.
PDMPs are perhaps so attractive because they hold the potential to
both facilitate legitimate prescribing of controlled substances, and also
93
mitigate prescription drug misuse. The appropriate prescribing of
controlled substances can reduce their misuse and diversion. At the same
time, law enforcement, licensing board, and surveillance efforts can
94
protect the public’s health by limiting diversion.
Despite these best intentions, we do not have a firm understanding of
PDMPs’ effectiveness, nor of the potential for unintended PDMP
consequences or other legal or ethical quagmires. Interest groups, however,
have attempted to identify a number of PDMP “best practices” to help
guide their implementation. They include the following: a comprehensive list
of drugs monitored; unsolicited reporting to providers; medical provider
education on PDMP use; a wide array of authorized users; real-time or
frequent data collection; interstate sharing of data; and disclosure of de95
identified data for research purposes. These characteristics appear to be
identified largely based on face validity and anecdotal or associative
96
observations, rather than rigorous evidence. In short, justification for
these features is wanting. The framework presented herein can assist in
systematically analyzing PDMP effectiveness, legality, and normative
appeal, with the goal of identifying desirable features that, if adopted,
could facilitate the achievement of public health goals and increase the
likelihood that these policies will succeed.
II. A Framework for Evaluating PDMP Success
State policymakers stand to benefit from an evaluative framework
that can be used to assess the success of PDMP efforts at curbing
prescription drug misuse for several reasons. First, the rapid escalation
and magnitude of the prescription drug misuse and overdoseswith
forty-four people in the United States now dying every day from
97
prescription painkiller overdose are remarkable and somewhat

92. Nat’l All. for Model State Drug Laws, supra note 68, at 3.
93. Id.; Clark et al., supra note 79, at 5.
94. Clark et al., supra note 79, at 5.
95. Id.; Nat’l Conference of Ins. Legislators, Proposed Best Practices to Address Opioid
Abuse, Misuse and Diversion §§ 1–4 (2013).
96. Clark et al., supra note 79 (reviewing the PDMP evidence comprehensively but failing to
differentiate between studies appropriate for causal inferencethat is, those that demonstrate effects
attributable to PDMPsand those of a merely associative or anecdotal nature). See infra Parts
III.B.2–3 for further discussion on evaluating PDMP effectiveness.
97. Drug Overdose Deaths in the United States Hit Record Numbers in 2014, Ctrs. for Disease
Control & Prevention, http://www.cdc.gov/drugoverdose/epidemic/index.html (last visited Aug. 5,
2016).
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unprecedented. Such a crisis warrants a robust and effective response,
which has led to rapid dissemination across the states of new legal
approaches, including PDMPs, before their effects have been thoroughly
evaluated. Second, the intervention possibilitiesfrom various PDMP
features to other types of interventions altogether (see Table 1 for a
non-exhaustive list)are numerous and could be overwhelming to
policymakers. Third, some indications of a leveling of opioid prescribing
and misuse from 2011–2013 are encouraging, but naturally beg the
question: Can we attribute any of these changes to state PDMPs?
It is incumbent upon policymakers at all levels to implement the
most prudent set of interventions possible to target prescription opioid
misuse, given current knowledge and limited resources. The states are a
98
reasonable and critical locus for policymaking. This Article does not
mean to imply that states are the exclusive or always optimal level at
99
which to regulate. Indeed, the federal government is very involved in
regulation of controlled substances, particularly under the CSA and via
FDA drug approval (see Table 1). However, the states have broadly
regulated to address prescription drug misuse and overdose using their
plenary powers to police the health, safety, and welfare of their
100
citizens. As compared to the federal government, states are closer in
proximity to these issues: They can better tailor prevention strategies to
the specific nature of and variation in prescribing and misuse risks across
their jurisdictions, and are directly accountable to their citizens when it
101
comes to adverse health and related consequences. Moreover, states
have typically assumed authority over the practice of medicine and other
102
health professions as well as health more generally, and thus the
98. See Garcia, supra note 10, at 43.
99. See Joanna Shepherd, Combating the Prescription Painkiller Epidemic: A National Prescription
Drug Reporting Program, 40 Am. J.L. & Med. 85, 86–87 (2014) (advocating for a national prescription
drug reporting program that builds upon pharmacy benefit manager networks to crack down on
prescription drug misuse); see also Roger S. Magnusson, Mapping the Scope and Opportunities for Public
Health Law in Liberal Democracies, 35 J.L. Med. & Ethics 571, 572 (2007) (noting that public health
regulatory functions are “shared” between different tiers of government, and together these elements at
the national and sub-national levels create a range of specific laws, processes, and remedies for improving
health outcomes).
100. States have initiated many prominent laws to address prescription drug misuse and overdose
beyond PDMPs. Other legal strategies include pain clinic (or “pill mill”) laws; drug dose and limit laws;
physical examination requirements; doctor shopping laws; tamper-resistant form requirements; prescription
drug identification laws; and Good Samaritan laws that provide protection to those who reasonably assist
others experiencing misuse or overdose. See Public Health Law Program: State Laws on Prescription Drug
Misuse and Abuse, Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, http://www.cdc.gov/phlp/publications/
topic/prescription.html (last visited Aug. 5, 2016).
101. Lawrence O. Gostin, Public Health Law: Power, Duty, Restraint 118 (2d ed. 2008); Scott
Burris & Evan Anderson, Legal Regulation of Health-Related Behavior: A Half Century of Public
Health Law Research, 9 Ann. Rev. L. & Soc. Sci. 95, 107 (2013).
102. See Barsky v. Bd. of Regents, 347 U.S. 442, 449 (1954); Michelle M. Mello & Kathryn Zeiler,
Disease Prevention and Health Outcomes, Empirical Health Law Scholarship: The State of the Field,
96 Geo. L.J. 649, 654 (2008) (noting that states have been the primary site of lawmaking for important
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prescribing of controlled substances (the source of most prescription
drugs that are misused) falls squarely within their purview. This Article
addresses the balance of regulation between state and federal
103
governments as it relates to how states can best target PDMPs, but it
does not cover non-governmental-based initiatives.
The separation of public health powers among different branches of
government, albeit fundamental to the way policies are conceived and
carried out, is not a focus of this Article. “State policymakers” or “state
regulators,” as referred to herein, signify members of both the legislative
and executive branches of state governments. Members of the legislature,
who are elected and politically accountable to the public, are typically
responsible for creating health policy and allocating resources required
104
to carry it out. Executive agencies, most notably departments of public
105
health, assume increasingly expansive public health functions in the
statesranging from proposing laws to the legislature, to issuing rules to
106
carry out policy, to enforcing policy. The framework proposed views
state policymakers as a monolithic group, capable of dividing and
delegating public health powers as between themselves efficiently and in
accordance with administrative law requirements.
107
This discussion also focuses on state public health laws, namely
108
PDMPs, rather than other types of interventions. Law is increasingly
recognized as an important determinant of health and a valuable and
109
effective tool in the public health arsenal. Law has been shown to have
a powerful impact in a number of public health domains, such as motor

aspects of health markets, including public health-related areas such as seatbelt and workplace
wellness, tobacco and alcohol, and unhealthful food and beverages in schools).
103. See infra Part II.A.2.
104. Gostin, supra note 101, at 83.
105. Id. at 161.
106. Id. at 83–84, 166–69.
107. “Public health law” has been famously defined by Lawrence O. Gostin as “the study of the
legal powers and duties of government to assure the conditions for people to be healthy (that is, to
identify, prevent, and ameliorate risks to health in the population), and the limitations on the power of
the state to constrain the autonomy, privacy, liberty, proprietary, or other legally protected interests of
individuals for protection or promotion of community health.” Id. at 4. Themes that emerge from this
definition and that will recur throughout this Article include: “(1) government power and duty, (2)
coercion and limits of state power, (3) government partners in the ‘public health system,’ (4) the
population focus, (5) communities and civic participation, (6) the prevention orientation, and (7) social
justice.” Lawrence O. Gostin, A Theory and Definition of Public Health Law, 10 J. Health Care L. &
Pol’y 1, 1 (2007).
108. Magnusson, supra note 99, at 572 (observing that law is only one of a multitude of “modes” of
regulation that reflect different strategies toward compliance and enforcement).
109. Mello et al., supra note 15, at 1979 (discussing law’s recent success in preventing childhood
lead poisoning and workplace injuries). See Scott Burris et al., Making the Case for Laws That Improve
Health: A Framework for Public Health Law Research, 88 Milbank Q. 169, 170 (2011); Wendy E.
Parmet, The Individual Mandate: Implications for Public Health Law, 39 J.L. Med. & Ethics 401, 411
(2011).
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vehicle safety, particularly when based on robust evidence. Specifically,
state laws are starting to proliferate in public health: The adoption of
legal interventions in a number of areas (PDMPs included) over the past
several decades has followed a steep curve from initial adoption in one
111
jurisdiction to nearly fifty-state saturation. Non-legal interventions are
also critical to addressing opioid misuse and the public’s health more
generally, but the use of PDMP laws“on the books” (such as constitutions,
112
statutes, rules, and judicial opinions) and as implemented in practice by
policymakers to address opioid misuse constitutes the focus of this
discussion.
This Article articulates a framework to assist state lawmakers’
decisionmaking when considering whether and how to respond to a
significant public health threat, and uses it to directly guide PDMP
113
implementation. This framework, which can be generalized to contexts
beyond prescription drug misuse, sets forth key criteria with which to
justify and assess public health lawsboth when considering initial policy
enactment and in evaluating regulations once implemented. The goal is
to identify the optimal form that a public health law should take once a
serious public health challenge has been identified. Broadly, the
evaluative criteria include: (1) legal powers to regulate and barriers to
implementation; (2) effectiveness of regulation; and (3) ethical and
normative considerations.
This evaluative framework integrates and builds upon earlier public
114
health law scholarship, including work on evidence-based lawmaking
115
and justificatory conditions for public health legal interventions. Mello
and Zeiler outline an ideal iterative process of research and policymaking
that a health law, informed by evidence, would takea so-called
116
“lifecycle” for an empirical health law success story. In their lifecycle,
society first identifies a significant public health risk factor derived from
110. Burris & Anderson, supra note 101, at 107.
111. Id.
112. Burris et al., supra note 109, at 174–75. “Legal interventions,” as discussed herein, may
include a full range of government use of legal authority, such as adoption of new laws, amendments
or clarifications to existing laws, and removal of laws thought to be ineffective. Mello et al., supra note
15, at 1980.
113. Gostin has outlined at least five models, or levers, for legal intervention designed to prevent
injury and disease and promote the public’s health: (1) the power to tax and spend; (2) the power to
alter the informational environment; (3) direct regulation of individuals (such as motorcycle helmet
laws), professionals (such as licenses), or businesses (such as inspections); (4) indirect regulation
through the tort system; and (5) deregulation. Lawrence O. Gostin, Public Health Law: A Renaissance,
30 J.L. Med. & Ethics 136, 137–38 (2002). This Article deals primarily with the first three intervention
levers, or affirmative regulatory acts engaged in by policymakers.
114. See generally Mello & Zeiler, supra note 102; Burris et al., supra note 109 (discussing the
newly founded Public Health Law Research Program and its mission, structure, and goals).
115. See generally Gostin, supra note 101 (discussing the legal foundations of public health
research).
116. See Mello & Zeiler, supra note 102, at 668–69.
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clear epidemiological evidence. Risk factors are exposures or attributes
that are associated with an increased likelihood of developing a disease
118
or injury. Significant risk factors can be characterized as variables that
greatly increase the risk of developing a disease, or those that are associated
with severe harm. Second, in response to such risks, policymakers,
researchers, or other key stakeholders may propose and experiment with
119
innovative legal solutions, among other types of policy responses. Third,
these experiments should be evaluated by researchers and policymakers,
ideally in cooperation. Finally, those public health laws identified as
successful should be retained, strengthened, and replicated in additional
jurisdictions, while those deemed unsuccessful should be abandoned (or
120
amended) in favor of policy alternatives.
Lawrence Gostin has articulated certain prerequisite conditions for
public health laws, reminding us that regulation is not justified merely in
121
the name of population health. Such laws must be defended given that
they incur public and private costs and can impact the legitimacy of
122
future policymaking. Gostin thus proposes five criteria with which to
evaluate whether a public health regulation is warranted: (1) significant
risk; (2) effectiveness; (3) economic cost; (4) burden on individuals; and
123
(5) fairness.
Figure 1 lays out the four stages articulated in Mello and Zeiler’s
124
lifecycle, but goes a step further to specify the specific criteria with
which to actually evaluate policy experiments and the ways in which
these criteria should be applied to justify any particular law’s existence.
Innovative concepts incorporated into this figure include: (1) that
evaluative criteria should be applied both at the law adoption stage as
well as the retrospective evaluation (of existing policy) stage; (2) that the
evaluation should be an ongoing process, rather than a one-time
occurrence; and (3) that states should revisit a policy upon each round of
evaluation to consider whether to retain, amend, or abandon a law.
Moreover, the specific evaluative criteria set forth in Figure 1 differ
from Gostin’s in several key regards. First, whereas Gostin does not focus
on a particular level of authority or jurisdiction, these criteria are intended
to organize state policymaker inquiries with respect to implementing public
health laws. Second, the criteria explicitly recognize legality as a
consideration to be incorporated into evaluation. Third, they re117. Id. See Gostin, supra note 101, at 55.
118. Health Topics: Risk Factors, World Health Org., http://www.who.int/topics/risk_factors/en/
(last visited Aug. 5, 2016).
119. Mello & Zeiler, supra note 102, at 669.
120. Id.
121. Gostin, supra note 101, at 43–76.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 55.
124. Mello & Zeiler, supra note 102, at 668.
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characterize and substantially expand upon the inquiries regarding policy
effectiveness and ethical appeal, drawing upon principles of research
design and practice-based public health ethics, respectively. The key
evaluative criteria further detailed below do not necessarily need to be
“satisfied” per se, but should be considered carefully and compared
between policy options, if multiple exist. Performing favorably under
these criteria lends credibility to public health laws and enhances state
policymaker and stakeholder confidence in their value. Consideration of
these criteria also may help to address issues of antiquity, inconsistency,
redundancy, and ambiguity that can render state public health laws
125
ineffective. In the discussion that follows, the three criteria will be
outlined and directly applied to PDMPs in an effort to organize and
inform this policymaking agenda.

125. Gostin, supra note 113, at 136–37 (discussing entrenched problems with state public health
lawsthat is, that they are often outdated, built up in layers over varying periods of time, and very
fragmented among the fifty statesthat call for reform so that law conforms with modern scientific
and legal standards, is consistent across jurisdictions, and is more uniform in how it addresses different
types of health threats).
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Figure 1. Framework for Evaluating State Public
Health Laws
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identifies a
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public health
risk
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propose a
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B. Effectiveness of regulation
o
1. 1 outcomes: intended
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o
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A. Legal Powers to Regulate
A threshold inquiry for state policymakers when considering
PDMPs and other public health laws is whether the requisite legal
powers to regulate exist, and/or whether legal barriers may frustrate
implementation. This inquiry drives to the heart of longstanding debates
about the appropriate balance of public health powers between different
levels of government, and constitutional limits on such powers in the
name of civil liberties. Legal powers, duties, and restraints, to use
126
Gostin’s terms, define the space available for public health intervention
and should be considered dynamically, given the potential for changes in
judicial interpretation of these parameters. State policymakers should
specifically ask: (1) whether they have the affirmative constitutional
power to act to promote or protect the public’s health; (2) whether the
actions planned or taken exceed their powers by encroaching upon
regulatory territory already occupied by the federal government; and (3)
127
whether the law in question infringes upon protected individual rights.
In general terms, state implementation of PDMPs stands on solid
legal footing. Nevertheless, the ways in which PDMPs are designed raise
a number of legal issues that warrant consideration, including the federal
government’s possible role in program implementation, privacy issues
associated with the retention of personal health information in the
databases, and the use of the data by law enforcement and licensing
boards.
1.

Federalism and the Power to Regulate the Public’s Health

Federalism divides available lawmaking power between two levels
128
of government: federal and state. The federal government acts with
limited, enumerated powers granted by the Constitution, while the
129
remaining powers, including the police power, are left to the states.
130
State governments have long held the authority, and sometimes duty,
126. Gostin, supra note 101.
127. See James G. Hodge, Jr., The Role of New Federalism and Public Health Law, 12 J.L. &
Health 309, 311 (1998).
128. Gostin, supra note 101, at 78.
129. Hodge, Jr., supra note 127, at 311. The Tenth Amendment states: “The powers not delegated
to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved for the States
respectively, or to the people.” U.S. Const. amend. X.
130. The Constitution is largely cast in negative terms, particularly with respect to public health
protection among the states. See, e.g., DeShaney v. Winnebago Cty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189
(1989) (holding that the Wisconsin State Department of Social Services had no affirmative duty to
provide protection to a four-year-old boy who was beaten severely and incurred permanent brain
damage after the Department received reports of the abuse and took no action). There are, however,
certain instances whereby the Constitution creates an affirmative duty for the government to protect
people from harm or provide health services, including: (1) for persons held in state custody (such as
prisons and mental institutions) who have been deprived of their liberty and are thus unable to care
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to protect and preserve public health, a critical role which dates to the
131
Federalist Papers and preceded the Constitution. As articulated in what
is widely viewed as a leading judicial decision in public health, Jacobson
v. Massachusetts, decided in 1905, state police powers include broad
powers to pursue reasonable regulations that promote the public health,
132
safety, welfare, or morals. While Jacobson dealt with infectious
diseasenamely, the right of the City of Cambridge, Massachusetts to
require smallpox vaccinationthe police power articulated therein
serves as the basis for a vast array of state public health laws ranging into
133
areas of non-communicable disease and injury. Beyond the police
power, states also posses parens patriae powers to act as guardians of
those who cannot protect themselves legally, namely children and
134
incompetent persons.
Although Jacobson is settled law and the states possess significant
power to police and protect the public’s health, they do not exclusively
135
inhabit the domain. Rather, the federal government has a role to play
in the areas in which it has clearly articulated jurisdiction under the
Constitution. Federal public health powers typically are found in the U.S.
Congress’s powers to tax, spend, regulate interstate commerce, and
employ the means reasonably necessary to achieving other federal
136
objectives (implied under the Necessary and Proper Clause). If there is
overlap between federal and state laws in these arenas, then federal law
supersedes (or preempts) that of the stateseven where states have

for themselves; or (2) if the state increased the threat of harm, and is responsible for creating danger.
Gostin, supra note 101, at 87.
131. Wendy E. Parmet, After September 11: Rethinking Public Health Federalism, 30 J.L. Med. &
Ethics 201, 202 (2002) (noting that the Federalist Papers refer to the “domestic police” of the states as
among the powers not available to the federal government); Hodge, Jr. supra note 127, at 314;
Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 87 (1824) (“[t]he constitution gives nothing to the States or to the people.
Their rights existed before it was formed, and are derived from the nature of sovereignty and the
principles of freedom.”). See Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 25 (1905).
132. Gostin, supra note 101, at 78, 121–26 (quoting Justice Harlan’s decision in Jacobson v.
Massachusetts, to say that “[t]he safety and the health of the people of Massachusetts are, in the first
instance, for that Commonwealth to guard and protect. They are matters that do not ordinarily
concern the National Government.”).
133. Wendy E. Parmet et al., Individual Rights Versus the Public’s Health100 Years After
Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 352 New Eng. J. Med. 652, 653 (2005).
134. This power is typically invoked by a state to make decisions on behalf of those who cannot
make decisions for themselves, or to justify the state’s more general interest in societal welfare and
health. See Gostin, supra note 101, at 95–98.
135. Parmet, supra note 131, at 202.
136. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8. For a more in-depth discussion of the federal enumerated powers
relevant to public health, see Gostin, supra note 101, at 98–109; Parmet, supra note 131, at 203–07;
Hodge, Jr., supra note 127, at 328–330; Lawrence O. Gostin, Public Health Theory and Practice in the
Constitutional Design, 11 Health Matrix 265, 271–72 (2011); James G. Hodge, Jr., Implementing
Modern Public Health Goals Through Government: An Examination of New Federalism and Public
Health Law, 14 J. Contemp. Health L. & Pol’y 93 (1997).
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acted appropriately within their police powers. In short, the federal
government can serve as a limiting factor to state public health
regulation.
The pendulum of power to regulate to promote the public’s health
has swung between state and federal governments over the course of the
twentieth century. First came the era of expansive state powers postJacobson. Next, federal authority in the public health arena increased
during the New Deal era when the Supreme Court broadened its
interpretations of the commerce, taxing, and spending powers with
national interests in mindevidencing the so-called “death” of
138
federalism. Most recently, state powers have been newly invigorated by
a series of cases that restrict federal power. Specifically, the Court has
curtailed Congress’s power to “commandeer” the states to carry out
139
federal programmatic objectives, and has limited the scope of the
140
commerce power. Although national public health goals are unifying,
141
they must be accomplished without infringing on state sovereignty.

137. U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2 (“This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall
be made in Pursuance thereof . . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land . . . .”). See Gostin, supra note
101, at 80 (discussing the different types of federal preemption, including “express preemption,” where
a federal statute explicitly declares that it preempts state or local law; and “implied preemption,”
where Congress’s intent to supersede state or local law is clearly implied in legislative language or
history. Implied preemption is further subdivided into two categories: (1) field preemption, whereby
federal regulation is so encompassing as to dominate an entire field and leave no space for state or
local action; and (2) conflict preemption, whereby compliance with state law would frustrate or make
impossible compliance with federal law). Federal action in an area of public health regulation need not
necessarily invalidate any state regulation, however. Federal laws often serve as a floor, above which
state regulation can impose more stringent standards. See, e.g., Interim Final Rules Under the Paul
Wellstone and Pete Domenici Mental Health Parity and Addiction Equity Act of 2008, 75 Fed. Reg.
5,410, 5,418, 5,430 (Feb. 2, 2010) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 146).
138. Hodge, Jr., supra note 127, at 311–12 (quoting Joseph Lesser, The Course of Federalism in
America, an Historical Overview, in Federalism: The Shifting Balance 11 (Janice C. Griffith ed.,
1987)).
139. See, e.g., New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 142, 149 (1992) (striking down a “take title”
provision of the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Management Act Amendments of 1985, which
required states to take ownership of and assume liability for waste if they did not dispose of
radioactive wastes in a particular way); Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012)
(ruling that Congress exceeded its powers by requiring in the Affordable Care Act that states expand
Medicaid eligibility up to 133% of the federal poverty level in order to receive any Medicaid federal
funds). But see South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987) (upholding a federal law withholding five
percent of federal highway funds from states that allowed people under twenty-one to buy alcoholic
beverages).
140. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 549 (1995) (holding that Congress lacked the
authority under the Commerce Powers, to make gun possession around schools under the Gun-Free
School Zones Act of 1990 a federal criminal offense); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000)
(finding that Congress lacked the authority to enact the Violence Against Women Act under the
Commerce Clause).
141. Hodge, Jr., supra note 127, at 356 (referring to this trend as signifying a “new federalism” era
in which public health action must be balanced among federal and state levels of government).
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Again, traditional state functions are central to the public’s health and
142
thus enjoy significant legal protection from federal intrusion.
2.

State and Federal Authority to Monitor Prescription Drugs

Regulating controlled substances to prevent misuse and associated
health and safety problems falls squarely within states’ police powers and
their parens patriae powers to act as guardians for those unable to protect
themselves, although the question of federal preemption arises as a
potential limitation to that exercise. Several state attorneys general have
successfully brought parens patriae lawsuits against Purdue Pharma, the
maker of OxyContin, under negligent marketing and public nuisance
theories to assert their state’s “quasi-sovereign” interests in the health,
143
safety, and welfare of its citizens. State police power also has been
exerted in numerous ways in the context of prescription opioid misuse,
including via law enforcement activities to identify doctor shoppers,
diverters, and high-volume prescribers, as well as through regulation of
144
health care professionals involved in prescribing and dispensing. States
have significantly expanded their legislative efforts in this area since the
1970s, enacting myriad laws that have generally gone unchallenged as
145
valid exercises of state police powers. Against this backdrop, there is
little debate that PDMP general establishment falls squarely within the
purview of state authority, to the extent PDMPs regulate the clinical
practices of prescribing and dispensing of narcotic medicines. That said,
and as discussed in Part II.A.4, PDMPs do raise certain privacy
146
objections related to the storage and use of prescription data.

142. Id.
143. See Richard C. Ausness, Symposium Article, The Role of Litigation in the Fight Against
Prescription Drug Abuse, 116 W. Va. L. Rev. 1117, 1146–56 (2014).
144. See Barsky v. Bd. of Regents, 347 U.S. 442, 449 (1954) (“It is elemental that a state has broad
power to establish and enforce standards of conduct within its borders relative to the health of everyone
there. . . . The state’s discretion in that field extends naturally to the regulation of all professions
concerned with health.”). The authority of the states to regulate the practice of medicine is longstanding
and extends to the field of narcotic prescribing. See Edward P. Richards, The Police Power and the
Regulation of Medical Practice: A Historical Review and Guide for Medical Licensing Board Regulation of
Physicians in ERISA-Qualified Managed Care Organizations, 8 Annals Health L. 201, 201–23 (1999)
(providing a history of the police power and the regulation of medical practice).
145. See Public Health Law Program: State Laws on Prescription Drug Misuse and Abuse, supra note
100 and accompanying text. Certain states have sought to regulate the supply of a certain controlled
substance, for example when Governor Deval Patrick of Massachusetts issued a public health
emergency declaration that empowered the public health commissioner to use emergency powers to
prohibit the prescribing and dispensing of hydrocodone-only medication (Zohydro, Zogenix), which
had been recently approved by the FDA. This type of action, however, encroaches upon the federal
government’s supreme role in drug safety approvalspecifically, the FDA’sand was found
unconstitutional when challenged by Zogenix. See Rebecca Haffajee et al., What Is a Public Health
“Emergency”?, 371 New Eng. J. Med. 986, 986–88 (2014).
146. See infra Part II.A.4.
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Although the states implement PDMPs with the requisite police
power authority, the federal government possesses concurrent authority
to regulate prescription drugs together with the states, a power derived
147
from the Commerce Clause. Under the Commerce Power, the U.S.
Congress may regulate: (1) the channels of interstate commerce; (2) the
instrumentalities of commerce (including persons and things in interstate
commerce); or (3) economic activities that have a substantial effect on
148
interstate commerce. The Supreme Court has found narcotic drugs to
satisfy all three prongs of this test, as they are “things” that flow through
an interstate supply chain (from manufacturer to distributor to pharmacy
149
to patient), the distribution of which impacts this interstate flow.
Congress’s regulation of controlled substances dates back to the
150
early 1900s. But, it truly expanded with the enactment of the CSA in
1970 and creation in 1973 of the DEA, an agency charged with policing the
issuance and dispensing of controlled substances, including prescription
151
drugs. To prescribe controlled substances in Schedules II through V,
licensed prescribers must register with the DEA every three years and
152
follow other administrative requirements. To avoid criminal liability
under the CSA, a prescriber may issue controlled substance prescriptions
only “for a legitimate medical purpose” when “acting in the usual course
153
of his professional practice.”

147. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
148. Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 150 (1971).
149. See Michael C. Barnes & Gretchen Arndt, The Best of Both Worlds: Applying Federal
Commerce and State Police Powers to Reduce Prescription Drug Abuse, 16 J. Health Care L. & Pol’y
271, 283–92 (2013) (describing in detail the Supreme Court’s application of the Commerce Power in
the context of federal regulation of narcotics to advocate for national prescriber education to reduce
prescription drug abuse).
150. See Shepherd, supra note 99, at 101.
151. See DEA Mission Statement, Drug Enf’t Admin., http://www.dea.gov/about/mission.shtml
(last visited Aug. 5, 2016). In addition, the federal government also established the FDA, which in
2012 used its powers to require ER/LA opioid manufacturers to develop a REMS given that the
potential risks of the drugs outweighed the benefits. The REMS policy requires these drug developers
to manage the risk of accidental or intentional abuse and risks to patients who are prescribed the drugs
but do not clinically need them, primarily by financing the education of prescribers and patients
regarding opioid risks and proper prescribing, storage, and disposal practices. Valarie Blake, Fighting
Prescription Drug Abuse with Federal and State Law, 15 Am. Med. Ass’n J. Ethics 443, 443–44 (2013).
See generally John F. Peppin et al., Issues and Critiques of the Forthcoming Risk Evaluation and
Mitigation Strategy (REMS) for Opioids in Pain Management, 27 Issues L. & Med. 91 (2011)
(suggesting that REMS is unlikely to reduce the bulk of prescription drug abuse that occurs with nonpatients); Hilary Homenko, Rehabilitating Opioid Regulation: A Prescription for the FDA’s Next
Proposal of an Opioid Risk Evaluation and Mitigation Strategy (REMS), 22 Health Matrix 273
(2012).
152. 21 U.S.C. §§ 823, 827–29 (West 2012). See supra note 90 and accompanying text for a
summary of the federal controlled substance Schedules.
153. 21 C.F.R. § 1306.04(a) (2013). Prescribers may also be held liable under certain state
controlled substance acts for unauthorized prescribing practices.
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Despite this expansive federal oversight of controlled substances
and jurisprudence relating to the Commerce Power, the federal
government has not chosen to use its Commerce Power to create any
national prescription monitoring program or curtail state plenary powers
154
to do so. Instead, it supports the states in monitoring prescription
drugs, thereby lending additional support to the idea that Congress has
little intention of preempting state PDMP creation. Specifically, the U.S.
Department of Justice has encouraged state PDMPs by creating the
Harold Rogers Prescription Drug Monitoring Program in 2002 to fund
program creation, the National Alliance for Model State Drug Laws to
help with policy coordination, and a Prescription Drug Monitoring
Program Center of Excellence at Brandeis University to identify best
155
None of this federal activity would be construed as
practices.
commandeering of the states, as the funds and support provided for
PDMPs relate directly to these programs and do not require program
156
establishment or operation.
The federal government, however, has not ceded this entire arena to
the states. As a reciprocal gesture for its support for PDMPs, the federal
government has elicited state cooperation with investigative activities
relating to prescription drug misuse. The DEA has requested certain
state PDMP data pursuant to administrative subpoenas, as authorized
under the CSA, to investigate drug crimesan action that raised
supremacy issues that ultimately went unresolved in Oregon Prescription
157
Drug Monitoring Program v. United States DEA. In this case, the DEA
was attempting to use its administrative subpoena power to access
Oregon PDMP records for an individual patient and for all drugs
158
prescribed by two physicians, absent a warrant. The Oregon PDMP
refused to comply with these subpoenas on the basis that doing so would
violate Oregon law, which says that PDMP data constitutes protected
health information and law enforcement can only access the data

154. In other words, the federal government has neither expressly preempted state PDMPs nor
enacted other controlled substance monitoring laws that would impliedly preempt state creation of
PDMPs. See Barnes & Arndt, supra note 149, at 292–95 (discussing circuit court decisions that reaffirm
the constitutionality of CSA regulations, but that have also found such regulations do not invalidate
state police powers to regulate medicine).
155. Deyo et al., supra note 76, at 604–05.
156. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 142 (1992).
157. Or. Prescription Drug Monitoring Program v. United States Drug Enf't Admin., 998 F. Supp. 2d
957, 960 (D. Or. 2014). The DEA appealed the district court’s ruling and is awaiting a decision from the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. The ultimate outcome of the case could influence the standards across
jurisdictions regarding DEA (and state law enforcement) access to PDMP data. The CSA empowers the
Attorney General, and executive agencies acting pursuant to his/her authority (including the DEA), with
broad authority to issue administrative subpoenas for information “relevant or material” to an
investigation relating to his/her functions “with respect to controlled substances.” 21 U.S.C. § 876(a)
(West 2012).
158. See Or. Prescription Drug Monitoring Program, 998 F. Supp. 2d at 960–61.
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pursuant to a valid court order based on probable cause for an authorized
159
drug-related investigation involving an individual. In a former instance
when the Oregon PDMP objected to a DEA request for PDMP data
(pursuant to an administrative subpoena) on all Schedule II through IV
controlled substance prescriptions issued by a particular physician over a
seven month period, a U.S. magistrate judge found Oregon’s court order
160
requirement to be preempted by the CSA. In Oregon Prescription Drug
Monitoring Program, the court never reached the supremacy issue
presented, however, instead deciding that the DEA’s use of administrative
subpoenas violated the Fourth Amendment, as discussed below in Part
II.A.4.
Given the concurrent jurisdiction of federal and state governments
to monitor prescription drugs, what is the appropriate balance of
powersparticularly when presented with a complex and serious public
health problem like prescription opioid misuse? Strong arguments can be
made for federal intervention, given markedly heterogeneous programs
across states, limited state resources, and the interstate components of
drug prescribing and dispensing involved. State PDMPs exhibit widely
varying features, most of which appear chaotically conceived and
uninformed by rigorous studies of effectiveness (as most programs were
adopted before much of an evidence base existed). State authorities may
lack the resources or expertise to operationalize PDMPs optimally, even
161
with federal assistance. Furthermore, prescription drug misuse is not
confined within state borders, as demonstrated by growing evidence of
162
doctor shopping across state lines and mail order pharmacies that can
163
send controlled substances across states. All of these factors weigh in
favor of uniform federal standards that could, in theory, more
164
comprehensively and deliberately address prescription drug misuse.
While the federal government has the authority and a set of
justifications to have its own PDMP, the creation of such a program
would require a major overhaul of deeply entrenched state programs.
State PDMPs represent huge investments; replacing them with a federal
system would seem wasteful and counter-productive just as we are
159. Id.; Or. Rev. Stat. § 431.966(2)(a)(C) (West 2016).
160. Or. Prescription Drug Monitoring Program v. United States Drug Enf't Admin., 998 F. Supp.
2d 957, 960 (D. Or. 2014). In other words, the magistrate judge found the DEA’s investigatory
authority reigned supreme over Oregon state law’s data access requirements. Id.
161. Clark et al., supra note 79, at 57–62; Gostin, supra note 101, at 81.
162. See, e.g., Douglas C. McDonald & Kenneth E. Carlson, The Ecology of Prescription Opioid
Abuse in the USA: Geographic Variation in Patients’ Use of Multiple Prescribers (“Doctor Shopping”),
23 Pharmacoepidemiology & Drug Safety 1258 (2014) (estimating that thirty percent of doctor
shoppers obtained prescriptions across state lines); Ken Lammers, Jr., Rise of the Pills, 15 UDCDCSL
L. Rev. 91, 102 (2011) (providing anecdotal evidence of doctor shopping across state lines).
163. See Anupam B. Jena et al., Prescription Medication Abuse and Illegitimate Internet-Based
Pharmacies, 155 Annals Internal Med. 848 (2011).
164. Gostin, supra note 101, at 81; Parmet, supra note 131, at 208.
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beginning to detect what may be promising health results. State
governments (and local governments to which they may delegate power)
are closer to the issues and have more flexibility than the federal
government to cater the programs to their citizenry’s public health needs,
opinions, and geographiesall of which can serve to enhance PDMP
166
results. Certain states may wish to implement specific features or
PDMPs in combination with other interventions for a greater impact. For
example, Florida chose to combine a PDMP with regulation of pill mills,
167
given the high concentration of these practices. States can also function
as “laboratories” to test new interventions and inform evidence-based
168
policy in other jurisdictions. The progressive, widespread adoption of
PDMPs from the 1990s through 2000s provides rich heterogeneity in
programs across states to allow for natural experiments that test different
features for the best results. In sum, leaving state PDMPs intact for
continued evaluation and potentially improvement seems preferable. As
a stronger evidence base about effective PDMP practices emerges, there
will be room for increased federal influence to achieve some consistency
across programs: The federal government should condition future state
169
PDMP funding on adoption of these identified practices. But at the
moment, while states seem to be an appropriate level at which to
implement PDMPs, policymakers face tough decisions with respect to
the form that these laws take, as guided by consideration of individual
liberties, effectiveness, and other ethical dimensions.
3.

Constitutional Limits on Public Health Regulation

Although state governments have broad authority to act in ways that
170
these
limit private interests in favor of the greater community,
infringements do have legal bounds. Individual liberty, autonomy, privacy,
and economic freedom enjoy protection from certain government

165. See infra Part II.B.3 for a discussion of the PDMP effectiveness literature.
166. See Gostin, supra note 101, at 81; Hodge, Jr., supra note 127, at 356.
167. See, e.g., Lainie Rutkow et al., Effect of Florida’s Prescription Drug Monitoring Program and
Pill Mill Laws on Opioid Prescribing and Use, 10 JAMA Internal Med. 1642 (2015) (finding that
Florida’s PDMP and pill mill laws were associated with modest decreases in total opioid volume
supplied, as well as in morphine milligram equivalents per transaction and opioid prescriptions).
168. Mello & Zeiler, supra note 102, at 654, 671–79 (discussing that state-based law provides the
opportunity for evaluation thanks to time-varying adoption of reform across jurisdictions, often for
reasons unrelated to the outcome variable of interest. The federal National Minimum Drinking Age
Act, which tied the minimum drinking age to national highway funds, was adopted after studies of
state innovations attributed beneficial health impacts to higher drinking ages).
169. See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987).
170. Parmet, supra note 109, at 401–11 (discussing the interdependency of health and the public
good nature of many interventions as justifications for public health interventions, such as the
individual mandate in the Affordable Care Act).
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intrusion under the Bill of Rights, as well as state constitutions and laws.
In addition to articulating the breadth of state authority to protect the
public’s health, Jacobson was the first case to carefully articulate a
framework for the protection of individual liberties in the exercise of
police power, which has been elaborated upon and developed in
172
subsequent case law interpreting the Constitution. The permissibility of
public health laws turns on scientific justification and the manner in which
173
they are applied. Specifically, public health powers are constitutional
only if exercised in accordance with the following legal principles: (1)
extraterritoriality; (2) necessity; (3) reasonableness; (4) due process rights;
174
and (5) equal protection principles. Freedom of expression principles
further impose significant barriers to public health regulation. For general
framing purposes, the above principles are outlined in brief and then
applied in detail as relevant to PDMPs.
For any given public health law, state policymakers should undertake
a careful constitutional analysis to anticipate private objections that could
frustrate implementation. First, states can regulate matters within their
175
borders, but not extraterritorially. Second, the exercise of police power
should be necessary to prevent an actual or looming threat to public
176
health, rather than a potential or hypothetical one. Third, the exercise of
state power must be reasonable. Here a policymaker would ask two
questions: (1) will the legal action taken plausibly be effective in achieving
its objective (that is, are the means reasonably related to the ends)?; and
(2) are there any obviously less burdensome alternatives that could have
177
been implemented instead?
Furthermore, individual rights to due process and equal protection
are constitutionally protected and must be considered in the affirmative

171. Gostin, supra note 101, at 85–86, 114–16. State constitutions and laws also provide parameters
for policymaker actions, but are too plentiful to be addressed comprehensively in this Article.
172. See generally Wendy K. Mariner et al., Jacobson v. Massachusetts: It’s Not Your Great-GreatGrandfather’s Public Health Law, 95 Am. J. Pub. Health 581 (2005) (tracing the evolution of
conceptions of state police powers and individual liberty over the century since Jacobson, finding that
the Court’s recognition of the relative importance of liberty has strengthened over time).
173. Parmet et al., supra note 133, at 654.
174. Although the facts in Jacobson did not require the Supreme Court to articulate equal
protection as a constitutionally required limitation, this standard had previously been articulated in
Jew Ho v. Williamson. Gostin, supra note 101, at 128 (citing Jew Ho v. Williamson, 103 F. 10 (N.D.
Cal. 1900)).
175. The police power is a state’s “recognized [] authority [] to enact . . . all laws that relate to
matters completely within its territory and which do not by their necessary operation affect the people
of other states.” Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 25 (1905).
176. Gostin, supra note 101, at 126–27 (the subject of compulsory intervention must pose an
actual, demonstrable threat to the community); Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 39 (not requiring that the
vaccination be administered against anyone who “with reasonable certainty” can show that he is not
the “fit subject of vaccination . . . by reason of his then condition, [which] would seriously impair his
health or probably cause his death.”).
177. See Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 31; Gostin, supra note 101, at 127.
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government exercise of public health powers. Individuals are free from
unwanted intrusionsincluding searches and seizuresin places in
which they have a legitimate expectation of privacy (such as their body
178
or property). Under the Fourth Amendment, a search is usually found
179
unreasonable absent a warrant from a judge showing probable cause,
180
with limited exceptions. The concept of liberty is also protected under
181
the Fifth Amendment and can be framed as two separate obligations:
procedural due process and substantive due process. Procedural due
process entitles individuals to fair procedurestypically, notice, a fair
182
hearing, and counsel when the government deprives them of life,
183
liberty, or property. Substantive due process relates to the protected
zone of individual liberty or privacy, where the government cannot enter
184
without adequate justification. And finally, any state governmentdrawn distinction between similarly situated personsfor example,

178. Gostin, supra note 101, at 403. The Fourth Amendment guarantees “the right of the people
to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures,”
and is extended to state governments via the Fourteenth Amendment. U.S. Const. amend. IV. See
Wilson v. Health & Hosp. Corp. of Marion Cty., 620 F.2d 1201 (7th Cir. 1980) (finding that health
official searches absent warrants or consent violated individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy
under the Fourth Amendment).
179. See, e.g., Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 534 (1967) (holding that a housing inspection of
an apartment was a violation of the Fourth Amendment absent a warrant or consent); See v. City of
Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 545 (1967) (finding the fire inspection of a business to be unconstitutional
without a warrant or consent).
180. Gostin, supra note 101, at 403–04, 468–69. If obtaining a warrant is impractical, the courts will
conduct an individualized assessment using reasonableness standardsprobing the importance of the
state interest, the degree of privacy invasion, and whether the state had a reasonable suspicion or
special need. Id. at 403–04. See Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 829 (2002) (holding that drug
testing high school students participating in extracurricular activities is reasonable given the important
state interests in protecting children’s health, the minimal intrusion associated with urine testing, and
the reduced expectation of privacy that schoolchildren possess). A special need must be something
aside from merely enforcing laws, although this standard has been interpreted more generously over
time. See, e.g., Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67 (2001) (finding that state hospital
performance of urine tests on pregnant women without their consent to obtain evidence for law
enforcement purposes constituted an unconstitutional search under the Fourth Amendment. No
special need was recognized given that the testing was linked to the state’s general interest in law
enforcement.); Loder v. City of Glendale, 927 P. 2d 1200, 1230 (1997) (striking down mandatory drug
tests for all city employees seeking promotions because they had already been tested, whereas drug
tests for new applicants were permissible given the lack of prior knowledge of their drug use).
181. The Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution states: “No person shall . . . be deprived of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. Const. amend. V. The Fifth Amendment
has been extended to the states under the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.
182. See, e.g., Greene v. Edwards, 263 S.E.2d 661, 663 (1980) (holding that people with communicable
tuberculosis must be afforded counsel, written notice, and the right to confront the witnesses against
them).
183. Gostin, supra note 101, at 132.
184. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562 (2003) (finding a liberty right to engage in
private acts, particularly intimate acts in nonpublic locations, such as the home).
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between persons of different races and ethnicities requires
186
justification based on equal protection principles. The level of scrutiny
applied by courts in considering substantive due process and equal
protection claims varies depending on the nature of the burdened right
187
or interest.
Although not raised in Jacobson or yet in the context of PDMPs,
freedom of speech is relevant to the evaluative framework and policymaking
calculus in other public health law contexts, such as regulating the
advertising of tobacco products. State regulators should be mindful that
courts afford exceptional protection to speech, and the trend has been
188
toward increasing protection of commercial speech, in particular. Indeed,
the First Amendment is, of late, arguably the most significant constitutional
barrier to state and federal public health regulation in the contexts of both
189
compelled speech and speech restrictions.
185

4.

Liberty Issues Raised by PDMPs

Although states are generally within the purview of their police
powers in creating PDMPs, certain features of these heterogeneous
programs have the potential to infringe upon individual rights and
freedoms and may, therefore, be subject to legal challenge. PDMPs, as
typically implemented, meet the extraterritoriality and necessity

185. See, e.g., Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 372 (1886) (striking down a facially neutral
ordinance restricting the washing of clothes in public laundromats after 10:00 p.m. on the basis that it
was being enforced with discriminatory intentonly against Chinese owners); Jew Ho v. Williamson,
103 F. 10, 26 (N.D. Cal. 1900) (finding that the quarantine of an entire district in San Francisco in
order to contain a bubonic plague epidemic was used as a guise to discriminate against Chinese people
who populated most of the area, the health of whom was actually placed at greater risk by the
quarantine).
186. The Fourteenth Amendment also provides that no state shall “deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” U.S. Const. amdt. XIV.
187. For further discussion of substantive due process, equal protection, and levels of constitutional
review, see Gostin, supra note 101, at 135–42.
188. Id.; see, e.g., Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 554–55 (2011) (finding that a Vermont state
statute banning the sale, use, or transmission of prescriber-identifiable data (absent prescriber consent)
violated data miner free speech rights); Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 376–77 (2002)
(holding that a provision of the FDA Modernization Act, which exempts certain compounded drugs from
having to satisfy drug approval requirements if the drug is not advertised or promoted, unconstitutionally
restricts pharmacists’ commercial speech); Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 555–56 (2001)
(holding that Massachusetts’ outdoor and point-of-sale advertising restrictions targeting smokeless
tobacco and cigars violated the First Amendment); R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Food & Drug Admin.,
696 F.3d 1205, 1221–22 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (holding that the FDA rule requiring graphic warning images on
cigarette packages and advertisements violates the First Amendment).
189. For academic discussion of this evolving and expansive body of law, see David Orentlicher, The
Commercial Speech Doctrine in Health Regulation: The Clash Between the Public Interest in a Robust First
Amendment and the Public Interest in Effective Protection from Harm, 37 Am. J.L. & Med. 299 (2011);
Micah L. Berman, Manipulative Marketing and the First Amendment, 103 Geo. L.J. 497 (2015).
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requirements for public health laws originally articulated in Jacobson.
Each program operates within its state’s borders, collecting data on
controlled substances dispensed within the state and permitting prescriber,
191
pharmacist, and sometimes regulator use of that data. Some interstate
sharing of information to authorized users (typically, prescribers or
192
pharmacists) or PDMPs in other states occurs, but any information
transmitted across state boundaries is usually shared reciprocally, subject
to the originating state’s requirements for authorized use, and intended to
complement public health efforts in both states. Furthermore, sharing of
data across state lines can be justified given the sometimes interstate
193
nature of prescribing, drug fills, and diversion. With regard to necessity,
there is little debate that the exercise of police power is necessary to
address opioid misuse and overdose, a public health threat of significant
194
and increasing magnitude.
Further, the programs appear reasonable in the Jacobson sense of
195
the term. PDMPs bear a real and substantial relation to the protection of
public health and safety: They aim to inform optimal prescribing as well as
to address patients and prescribers with outlier fill and prescribing
patterns, respectively. Given that the vast majority of drugs misused
196
originate from prescribers, either directly or indirectly, prescribing is a
reasonable level at which to intervene to address the epidemic. Also,
because a small percentage of prescribers source the majority of opioids,
and because a small percentage of patients receive disproportionately
197
large amounts of opioids, outliers in each of these categories are
reasonable targets for intervention. If challenged, a court would likely
view a state’s decision to implement a PDMP in lieu of or in addition to
other available interventions that target prescription drug misuse (such as
198
pain clinic laws ) with deference, finding it neither arbitrary nor totally
unreasonable.

190. See Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 25 (1905) for a definition of states’ “police
power.” See supra note 175 of this Article for such a definition.
191. Nat’l All. for Model State Drug Laws, supra note 68, at 4.
192. Interstate Sharing of Prescription Monitoring Database Information, Nat’l All. for Model
State Drug Laws (2014), http://www.namsdl.org/library/BCC76DA9-E7E5-7D40-AE816BB3141687D7/
(last visited Aug. 5, 2016).
193. Id.
194. See Gostin, supra note101, and text accompanying note 176; Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197
U.S. 11 (1905); see also Part I, supra for a discussion of the public health significance of opioid misuse.
195. See supra note 175 and accompanying text.
196. See supra notes 11–12 and accompanying text.
197. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Addressing Prescription Drug Abuse in the
United States: Current Activities and Future Opportunities 15–17 (2013).
198. Laws that regulate “pill mills,” or pain management clinics that source large quantities of
prescriptions, aim to prevent these facilities from inappropriately prescribing controlled substances. Such
laws typically provide for state oversight of pill mills and contain other requirements pertaining to ownership
and operation of the facility. For instance, a law may set forth personnel and operational requirements,
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The heart of challenges to PDMPs revolves around informational
privacy rights. These rights can be located in the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments, as well as in federal and state confidentiality laws. Because
statewide prescription dispensing data is aggregated in a database that
can be widely accessed by many types of authorized users, PDMPs
present new possibilities for security breaches in which private
information is disclosed to the general public, as well as for law
enforcement and licensing body use of the data. The potential for broad
data access raises privacy concerns among patients and prescribers and
could reduce their drug seeking and prescribing behaviors, respectively.
Some such behavior changes may be desirable, given that a central
purpose of PDMPs is to have a deterrent effect on over-prescribing,
doctor shopping, and diversion. But other behavioral changes may be
199
and undesirable, such as the chilling of appropriate
unintended
prescribing or patient access to legitimately needed painkillers. Courts
seek to balance the competing state and individual privacy interests in
determining the legality of PDMPs and access to prescription
information contained therein.
The Supreme Court addressed the right to informational privacy in
prescription records under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
200
Amendment in Whalen v. Roe. In Whalen, the Court considered
whether New York’s paper prescription monitoring program (which also
collected the prescription information in a computerized database)
violated individual interests in (1) avoiding disclosure of personal matters,
201
and/or (2) independence in important decisionmaking. The Court
admitted that the monitoring program could have a chilling effect on
opioid prescribing and use. Nonetheless, it found that the program
adequately safeguarded physicians’ and patients’ right to informational
privacy, emphasizing the extensive security protections in place to keep
private information from being disclosed and the fact that the decision
202
whether to prescribe or use a drug is still left to patients and doctors.
Subsequent state courts have considered the right to informational
privacy in prescription records housed in individual pharmacies, rather
than statewide databases, and relied on the Whalen precedent to find no

inspection and licensure procedures, standards of care, and/or patient billing procedures. See Ctrs. for
Disease Control & Prevention, supra note 66.
199. See infra Parts II.B–C for additional consideration of unintended consequences of PDMPs
under the evaluative framework.
200. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
201. Id. at 591, 599–600.
202. Id. at 600–02, 604 (noting protections, including a receiving room protected by a locked wire
fence and alarm system, limited access to a small number of people, and serious penalties for unlawful
release). The Court also found that any physician claim regarding potential disclosure of patient
information was “derivative from, and therefore no stronger than, the patients’”in other words,
rejecting physician privacy rights violations in this context. Id. at 604.
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203

constitutional violations. Although not yet squarely addressed by any
court, it seems unlikely an electronic PDMP would infringe upon
Fourteenth Amendment privacy rights if adequate safeguards were in
204
place to protect the data from public disclosure.
Patient (and prescriber) Fourth Amendment privacy rights are also
implicated by warrantless searches of PDMP data by law enforcement
officials and other regulators. In almost all states, professional licensing
bodies and law enforcement officials can access PDMP data for the
respective purpose of conducting administrative searches and pursuing
205
criminal investigations against patients, prescribers, or pharmacists.
What differs from state to state is whether these officials can access the
data simply pursuant to an active investigation, or whether they need to
satisfy the more stringent standards of accessing the information only
206
with a court-issued search warrant, subpoena, or order. While the
stated goals of PDMPs varyand many programs explicitly do aim to
207
prevent criminal activities such as diversion and doctor shopping a
common primary goal is to improve health care by reducing drug misuse
208
If law enforcement and
and facilitating appropriate prescribing.
licensing officials are given access to the files absent any probable cause
or reasonable restrictions around terms of access, PDMPs could easily
turn into tools primarily used to troll for criminal or medical misconduct.
This shift in emphasis could induce a chilling effect on prescribing and
prescription drug use in ways that actually interfere with optimal medical
care.
The Whalen Court did not decide whether a centralized state
database housing prescription records implicates the Fourth Amendment
203. See, e.g., State v. Wiedeman, 835 N.W.2d 698, 714 (Neb. 2013) (finding no violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment after “weighing the State’s significant interest in the regulation of potentially
dangerous and addictive narcotic drugs against the minimal interference with one’s ability to make
medical decisions and the protections from broader dissemination to the general public”); Stone v.
City of Snow, 593 N.E.2d 294, 301 (Ohio 1992) (holding that the Ohio statutes permitting warrantless
inspection of prescriptions, orders, and records to law enforcement officials and regulators did not
violate doctor, patient, or pharmacist rights to privacy as they did not allow disclosure to the general
public and included adequate safeguards).
204. In a Whalen v. Roe concurrence, Justice Brennan did express concerns with the computerized
storage of sensitive information, leaving open the possibility that the Court would view electronic
PDMPs, whereby data are shared across a wide network of authorized users, as a heightened invasion of
privacy. David B. Brushwood, Maximizing the Value of Electronic Prescription Monitoring Programs,
31 J.L. Med. & Ethics 41, 43 (2003). But see Dilcher, supra note 40 (suggesting it is unlikely that the
Supreme Court will invalidate electronic PDMPs on general privacy grounds).
205. Nat’l All. for Model State Drug Laws, supra note 68, at 5, 25–26. In a handful of states,
the PDMP is actually housed within a law enforcement or professional licensing agency, as opposed to
a health agency, thereby giving these regulators and officials’ unfettered access to the records. Id. at
25–26.
206. Id.
207. Corey S. Davis et al., Overdose Epidemic, Prescription Monitoring Programs, and Public
Health: A Review of State Laws, 105 Am. J. Pub. Health e9, e9–e10 (2015).
208. Id.
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209

right to privacy. However, other state and federal courts have addressed
this right in the context of pharmacy-housed prescription records,
generally finding that although patients have a subjective expectation of
privacy in their prescription records, they do not have a privacy right that
210
society is prepared to recognize as objectively reasonable as is also
211
required to invoke Fourth Amendment protections. Some courts have
justified patients’ (and prescribers’) reduced expectation of privacy in
pharmacy records on the basis that most states have laws that explicitly
212
allow certain officials access to these records without a warrant. Other
courts have recognized pharmaceuticals as a pervasively regulated
213
industry and thus applied the three-pronged test set out in New York v.
214
Burger to determine whether a warrantless search is reasonable. In
applying the Burger test, courts have typically found that allowing
searches of prescription data furthers substantial and well-established
government interests in regulating prescription drugs, and that notice
requirements are met if these searches are conducted during reasonable
215
hours. Most courts have found the warrant exception applies to
administrative inspections of pharmacy records, such as those conducted
by pharmacy boards, though some also have applied it to searches
216
conducted pursuant to criminal investigations.
209. The Court declined to address the Fourth Amendment arguments brought by physician and
patient plaintiffs because the case did not “involve affirmative, unannounced, narrowly focused
intrusions into individual privacy during the course of criminal investigations.” Whalen v. Roe, 429
U.S. 589, 604 n.32 (1977).
210. See, e.g., State v. Wiedeman, 835 N.W.2d 698, 710–11 (Neb. 2013); State v. Russo, 790 A.2d
1132, 1152 (Conn. 2002); Stone v. City of Snow, 593 N.E.2d 294, 300–01 (Ohio 1992).
211. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
212. See Douglas v. Dobbs, 419 F.3d 1097, 1102 (10th Cir. 2005); Murphy v. State, 62 P.3d 533, 536
(Wash. Ct. App. 2003); State v. Underwood, No. K2/98-0485A, 1999 WL 47159, at *5 (R.I. Super. Ct.
Jan. 20, 1999); Gettel v. State, 449 So.2d 413, 414 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984). See Russo, 790 A.2d at
1141. See Nat’l All. for Model State Drug Laws, Prescription Monitoring Programs, Pharmacy
Records and the Right to Privacy 21–37 (2014) (providing a catalogue of these pharmacy records
access laws).
213. In its close level of regulation, the pharmaceutical industry is distinguishable from certain
other areas of health. See, e.g., Tucson Woman’s Clinic v. Eden, 379 F.3d. 531, 551 (9th Cir. 2004)
(holding that an Arizona regulation that required abortion clinics to submit to warrantless inspections
by the Arizona Department of Human Services violated the Fourth Amendment. The Ninth Circuit
determined that the administrative search exception was inapplicable because abortion services are
not a closely regulated business).
214. New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691 (1987). To determine whether a warrantless search is
reasonable, three criteria must be met: (1) there must be a substantial government interest in
regulating this area; (2) the regulatory scheme must further that government interest; and (3) the
regulation must provide a constitutionally adequate substitute for a warrantin other words, it must
provide comprehensive notice to the target of the search and appropriately limit the time, place, and
scope of the search. Id. at 702.
215. See Terraciano v. Montanye, 493 F.2d 682, 683–85 (2d Cir. 1974); State v. Welch, 624 A.2d
1105, 1110–12 (Vt. 1992); Stone, 593 N.E.2d at 300–01.
216. State v. Jarvis, No. 16388, 1998 WL 57342, at *4–5 (Ohio Ct. App. Feb. 13, 1998) (finding that
inspectors were not required to ignore evidence of criminality discovered during a warrantless
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PDMPs, however, raise unique issues with respect to unfettered
searches, particularly when conducted by law enforcement or licensing
officials, which justify different data access standards from those applied
to pharmacy-housed records. PDMPs centralize all dispensing data
generated within a state (and sometimes across states), rather than that
from a single pharmacy. Most are fully electronic and searchable, for
instance by prescriber, pharmacy, or patient nameor conceivably by
controlled substance or prescribing volume. Under the mosaic theory,
the aggregation of prescription information in PDMPs should be covered
by a reasonable expectation of privacy under the Fourth Amendment,
217
even if each individual pharmacy-housed record may not be. Moreover,
although the third-party doctrine suggests that when certain records are
turned over and maintained by third-parties, they are no longer private
and not protected by the Fourth Amendment when exposed to others,
significant support for patients’ expectation of privacy in medical records
218
exists. Because PDMP data, by virtue of their comprehensive nature,
are akin to medical records, there is a strong argument that such records
are entitled to some measure of protection from unfettered access by
government officials.
Indeed, the heightened Fourth Amendment privacy concerns
associated with PDMPs were recognized in Oregon Prescription Drug
Monitoring. In this leading case in the area, the American Civil Liberties
Union (“ACLU”) intervened on behalf of the PDMP to raise arguments
about individual physician and patient Fourth Amendment privacy rights
administrative search conducted with independent administrative justification); Welch, 624 A.2d at 1112;
Stone, 593 N.E.2d at 300–01. See State v. Desper, 783 N.E.2d 939 (Ohio Ct. App. 2002) (finding that once
a search ceases to be administrative in nature and a criminal investigation commenced, a warrant was
required); State v. Penn, 576 N.E.2d 790 (Ohio 1991) (upholding lower court’s grant of a motion to
suppress evidence uncovered during a joint inspection by the state pharmacy board and the police, given
that the search was undertaken for general criminal purposes, stating that, the “board cannot act as a
surrogate for the police to obviate the constitutional duty of obtaining a search warrant.”). But see Penn,
576 N.E.2d at 723; Commonwealth v. Frodyma, 436 N.E.2d 925 (Mass. 1982) (refusing to extend the
warrant exception to criminal investigations).
217. See Benjamin J. Priester, Five Answers and Three Questions After United States v. Jones
(2012), the Fourth Amendment “GPS Case”, 19–28 (Mar. 28, 2012), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2030390 (noting five Justices’ express support for the “mosaic theory” in U.S.
v. Jones, or the idea that the aggregation of information may be covered by a reasonable expectation
of privacy, even though each discrete piece of information standing alone would not. The mosaic
theory, which suggests the Fourth Amendment protection can be triggered when the sheer quantity of
information becomes great, applies both to information presented to the public and that turned over
to a third-party, like PDMP data. However, the precise parameters of how this theory will be applied
by the Court remain uncertain). For additional arguments in favor of the mosaic theory, see Wayne A.
Logan, “Mosaic Theory” and Megan’s Laws, 2011 Cardozo L. Rev. De Novo 95 (2011).
218. See, e.g., State v. Skinner, 10 So. 3d 1212, 1218 (La. 2009) (finding that the Fourth Amendment
requires a search warrant before a search of medical or prescription records for criminal investigative
purposes can be undertaken); Doe v. Broderick, 225 F.3d 440, 451 (4th Cir. 2000) (holding that a
patient at a methadone clinic had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the records on file there, given
their intimate and private nature).
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in their PDMP information. Notwithstanding federalism issues discussed
above in Part II.A.2, the federal district court decided in favor of the
ACLU and held that the Fourth Amendment was violated by the DEA’s
use of administrative subpoenas (rather than a court-issued warrant) to
obtain PDMP records for an individual patient’s prescriptions and for all
219
drugs prescribed by two physicians. The court found that both patients
and physicians have subjective and objective expectations of privacy in
220
PDMP records for the Schedule II through IV drugs at issue. The court
found that although patients must expect that medical personnel will
access their prescription files, it is reasonable for patients to expect that
law enforcement will not have access to the PDMP recordsgiven the
intensely personal nature of the data (often revealing a person’s medical
condition and treatment patterns) and information on the PDMP’s website
221
that emphasized the protection of confidential information. Although the
district court’s decision is not binding in other jurisdictions and a few
222
state courts have held alternately, PDMPs are beginning to follow
Oregon Prescription Drug Monitoring guidance by increasingly requiring

219. Or. Prescription Drug Monitoring Program v. United States Drug Enf't Admin., 998 F. Supp.
2d 957, 960, 967(D. Or. 2014).
220. Id. at 964–67.
221. Id. at 966–67. The district court found it “difficult to conceive of information that is more
private or more deserving of Fourth Amendment protection” than prescription drug information that
would reveal if a patient is being treated for gender identity disorderas would be captured by PDMP
records. Prescribing records of this kind are protected against government intrusion by a “heightened
privacy interest rendering the use of administrative subpoenas unreasonable.” Id. The court also
dispensed with the DEA’s assertion that the “third-party doctrine” undermines the patient/prescriber
expectations of privacy because (1) PDMP records are inherently personal and private; and (2) doctors
and patients do not voluntarily convey the information to the PDMPrather it is required by law that
all dispensing information be included. Id.
222. Williams v. Commonwealth, 213 S.W.3d 671, 676–78 (Ky. 2006) (finding that the Kentucky
statute authorizing warrantless searches of PDMP data is facially constitutional and does not amount to a
“search,” because only limited data of Schedules II-V controlled substances that did not reveal a patient’s
medical condition or treatment were conveyed); Lambert v. Larizza, Case No. 13-314-2-CICI (Fla. Cir.
Ct. Feb. 13, 2014) (holding that the production of PDMP prescription records for 3300 patients to state
and federal law enforcement officials pursuant to a warrantless request did not violate Florida’s
constitution because there is a reduced expectation of privacy in prescription records); Florida Judge
Rules Government Can Search Prescription Drug Monitoring Database, Thomson Reuters (Feb. 21,
2014), http://blog.legalsolutions.thomsonreuters.com/practice-of-law/florida-judge-rules-government-cansearch-prescription-drugmonitoring-database/ (discussing the ruling in Lambert v. Larizza). See Jodie
Tillman, California High Court to Consider Limits on Regulators’ Access to Prescription Database, L.A.
Daily News (Apr. 26, 2015), http://www.dailynews.com/general-news/20150426/california-high-court-toconsider-limits-on-regulators-access-to-prescription-database (last visited Aug. 5, 2016) (describing the
decision of a California state appeals court that found medical board use of PDMP data to identify a
physician with outlier prescribing trends that led to his administrative probation does not violate the
patients’ rights to privacy under the state constitution. The court found that medical records are not
comparable to prescription records from a privacy standpoint, as the latter are subject to regular scrutiny
by law enforcement and regulatory agencies).
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a search warrant or a court-issued subpoena for law enforcement officials
223
to access PDMP data.
Privacy protections for PDMP data can also be located in nonconstitutional sources, such as the Health Insurance Portability and
224
Accountability Act (“HIPAA”) and state privacy laws. The HIPAA
“Privacy Rule” creates a national standard for the protection of
individually identifiable health care information from disclosure by
“covered entities” (or health care providers), with limited exceptions that
225
may apply to PDMP data. For example, a covered entity may disclose
health information that identifies a patient without receiving permission
from that individual for enumerated exceptions germane to PDMPs,
including: disclosures required by law; public health activities; health
oversight activities; law enforcement purposes; and for treatment,
226
payments, and health care operations. Moreover, HIPAA does not
preempt state law (including state privacy and PDMP laws) if the
Secretary of Health and Human Services determines that the state
provision serves a compelling public health need or has as its principal
227
purpose the regulation of any controlled substance, among other aims.
All of this suggests that HIPAA should not prevent the sharing of
information via PDMPseither by dispensers when initially logged into
the PDMP or to authorized users of PDMPsso long as the information
shared is limited to the minimum necessary to achieve the intended
228
purpose.

223. Nat’l All. for Model State Drug Laws, supra note 68, at 2; Devon T. Unger, Minding
Your Meds: Balancing the Needs for Patient Privacy and Law Enforcement in Prescription Drug
Monitoring Programs, 117 W. Va. L. Rev. 345, 386 (2014) (arguing that patients have a legitimate
interest in personally identifiable PDMP data and that the Fourth Amendment requires law
enforcement to obtain a warrant before accessing such data). Still, thirty states allow law enforcement
to conduct searches of PDMP data merely pursuant to an active investigation, and many allow
licensing boards to do the same. Nat’l All. for Model State Drug Laws, supra note 68, at 25–26.
224. Unger, supra note 223, at 362–64.
225. 45 C.F.R. §§ 160, 164 (2012). “Covered entities” include medical or health care service
providers, such as physicians and pharmacists, who electronically transmit individually identifiable
information in connection with financial or administrative activities related to health care.
Id. §§ 164.501, 164.506, 164.512.
226. 45 C.F.R. §§ 164.501, 164.506, 164.512 (2012).
227. HIPAA does not preempt state law (including a PDMP law) if the Secretary of Health and Human
Services determines that the provision serves a compelling public health need, or has “as its principal purpose
the regulation of the manufacture, registration, distribution, dispensing, or other control of any controlled
substance;” or “provides for the reporting of disease or injury . . . or for the conduct of public health
surveillance, investigation, or intervention.” 45 C.F.R. §§ 160.203(a)(1)–(2), 160.203(c). See Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) Privacy Rule and Prescription Drug Monitoring Programs
(PMPs), Nat’l All. for Model State Drug Laws (2010), http://www.namsdl.org/library/BB52D3BB-1372636CDD90AC3AAB8D724F/ (last visited Aug. 5, 2016).
228. 45 C.F.R. § 164.502(b)(1). At least one federal lawsuit charges that access by a local police
department of a man’s prescription history without probable cause, a subpoena, or court order is a violation
of HIPAA. Mollie Bryant, Brandon Denies Police Violated HIPAA, The Clarion-Ledger (Jan. 25, 2016),
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Moreover, some states include explicit privacy protections in their
PDMP laws. These steps are advisable for all programs and include:
229
exempting PDMP data from public records requests; imposing criminal
230
or civil penalties for unauthorized disclosure of PDMP data; limiting
authorized users of the data to a select set of professionals; and explicitly
requiring that the housing entity comply with all relevant state and
231
federal privacy and confidentiality laws. States should also put in place
substantial data security protections to avoid disclosure of PDMP
information, especially if data is shared across state lines. These
measures include password-protected access (and careful authentication
of all users), data encryption software, preventing unauthorized
downloads of the data, and monitoring for potential security breaches.
While some states set forth stricter conditions for law enforcement
and licensing official access PDMP files, as compared to pharmacy232
housed files, the majority still allow warrantless searches. The Oregon
Prescription Drug Monitoring decision to require law enforcement
officials to obtain a warrant based on probable cause strikes a reasonable
balance between facilitating federal and state law enforcement drug
investigations and protecting physician-patient interests and medical
privacy. These data access requirements should also be extended to
licensing bodies given their analogous role to law enforcement and
ability to sanction medical professionals by revoking or suspending
medical licenses. Otherwise, unfettered access to prescription records by
law enforcement and licensing officials runs a higher risk of hampering
prescribing and/or opioid use to an extent that compromises legitimate
pain management. State rules that require the data be housed within a
health agency and limit PDMP authorized users to those who use the
data for clinical purposesand provide the data (absent a warrant) to
others (such as researchers, law enforcement, or licensing bodies) only
on a de-identified basisrun the least risk of running afoul of privacy
laws or interfering with the doctor-patient relationship. Moreover,
requiring law enforcement and licensing bodies to obtain a warrant does
233
not substantially interfere with their duties and is therefore reasonable.
http://www.clarionledger.com/story/news/2016/01/25/brandon-denies-bpd-violated-hipaa/79313188/ (last
visited Aug. 5, 2016).
229. Thirty-one states currently exempt PDMP data from public records laws. Nat’l All. for
Model State Drug Laws, supra note 68, at 41.
230. Thirty-eight states currently have such penalties for disclosing or obtaining PDMP data
without authorization. Id. at 42. However, enforcement of these penalties is not well-documented.
231. Nat’l All. for Model State Drug Laws, supra note 68; Unger, supra note 223, at 379–82
(proposing that all data be personally de-identified before disclosure to law enforcement officials).
232. See Nat’l All. for Model State Drug Laws, supra note 68, at 22–37; Nat’l All. for Model
State Drug Laws, Types of Authorized RecipientsProfessional Licensing or Regulatory Boards
(2014).
233. See People v. Curco Drugs, Inc., 350 N.Y.S.2d 74, 84 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1973) (“[O]btaining of a
warrant would not have seriously undermined the [statute allowing administrative inspections of
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In summary, states seem to be the appropriate level for PDMP
implementation and a federal PDMP is neither a realistic option on the
horizon nor a necessary one. However, certain features of state PDMPs
can infringe upon protected individual rights and should be carefully
considered going forward. Given the potential for broad PDMP data
access that could hinder optimal medical care by affecting doctor and
patient behavior around opioid prescribing and drug seeking, PDMPs
should be guarded carefully by the housing entity and available to a
limited subset of users under select circumstances. Most notably, law
enforcement and licensing officials should only obtain the data pursuant
to a warrant based on probable cause. Penalties for unauthorized data
disclosure should be clear, strong, and enforced.
B. Effectiveness of Regulation
Even if a PDMP seems likely to withstand privacy challenges,
policymakers must further inquire into the effectiveness of a particular
approach. This second consideration with respect to public health laws is
empirical in nature: Will (or does) the regulation in questioneither
proposed or already implementedeffectively address the immediate
public health threat? State regulators should specifically ask: (1) what are
the public health outcomes this law seeks to impact?; (2) do these
outcomes align with pre-defined primary and secondary health outcomes
we seek to target?; (3) does sufficient, credible evidence exist to suggest
that the law will achieve (or has achieved) intended public health
outcomes when applied to the context and environment at hand?; and (4)
Is the predicted or actual ratio of intended to unintended consequences
high enough to warrant implementation?
This Article considers public health laws that are “interventional” in
nature, meaning those that are intended to either directly affect health
outcomes, or to impact health via mediating factors (such as health
behaviors or environments) in the causal chain between laws and health
234
outcomes. Interventional laws are central to answering the question at
the core of public health lawmaking: “What are the best legal tools to use
235
to promote health?” Nevertheless, many other types of public health
laws, such as those of infrastructural and incidental natures, are critical to

pharmacy premises without a warrant]’s purpose of deterring violations. Clearly, it would have been
only a minimal interference with their duties to obtain a warrant.”).
234. Anthony D. Moulton et al., The Scientific Basis for Law as a Public Health Tool, 99 Am. J. Pub.
Health 17, 17 (2009) (distinguishing “interventional” public health laws, or those designed to address
specific health conditions or risk factors, from “infrastructural” public health laws, or those that empower
public health agencies and jurisdictions); Burris et al., supra note 109, at 175 (further delineating further a
third category, “incidental public health law,” as comprised of those policies that impact population
health although they are not on their face oriented toward health).
235. Burris et al., supra note 109, at 186.
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236

effective policymaking, and this framework could be adapted to
measure the success of those laws as well.
With respect to interventional laws, the level of certainty required to
deem a regulation effective can vary. As a general matter, policymakers
should aim to identify robust evidence, generated using optimal designs
for establishing causality, to support a particular regulatory approach. In
other words, does the law itself cause intended changes in targeted health
237
outcomes? This question can and should be assessed at different stages.
If a policy is being newly considered for implementation, regulators can
consider evidence generated from comparable contexts to support law
238
initiation. Alternatively, if the law is already implemented, regulators
can focus on retrospective evaluations of the specific law as well as
literature reviewing similar policies to determine whether the law should
be retained, revised, or abandoned in favor of other policy options
(Figure 1). Policymakers might also consider a package of laws or a law
intervention paired with a different type of policy, such as a PDMP
combined with prescriber education initiatives, in which case they should
seek evidence to support the interactive effects of these multiple
239
interventions.
Fortunately, in contemporary times, research on the effectiveness of
240
public health law is increasingly available. Public health law research
(“PHLR”) may be generated from within the legal academy, where there
has been an explosion of empirical work in recent years, or from
researchers in other social science fields (such as economics, health
services research, political science, or public policy) that “use systematic
methods within an explicit theoretical framework to collect and analyze
241
data.” The translation of available scientific evidence (research) into

236. Id. at 175, 186; Burris & Anderson, supra note 101, at 109.
237. See J. Frank Wharam & Norman Daniels, Toward Evidence-Based Policy Making and Standardized
Assessment of Health Policy Reform, 298 JAMA 676, 677 (2007) (identifying the need for systematic and
ongoing evaluations of new health policies, the lack of which has led to the discovery of unintended
consequences years after policy implementation, and presenting a framework for maximizing the
effectiveness and ethical characteristics of health policy. The four essential elements identified in the
framework include: “(1) [r]eview to ensure that the policy’s fundamental precepts are ethical . . . (2)
[t]argeted pilot projects or timely retrospective assessments to address benefits and harms for
stakeholders . . . (3) [s]tudies to determine if unintended consequences can be satisfactorily
minimized . . . [and] (4) [f]eedback systems to maintain acceptable outcomes after policy implementation.”).
238. Burris et al., supra note 109, at 187.
239. See Nancy E. Kass, An Ethics Framework for Public Health, 91 Am. J. Pub. Health 1776, 1778
(2001) (observing that if a law is one of multiple and varied interventions that together are designed to
reduce health risks and poor health, then interventions and studies must be designed with the
awareness of the relationship between this program of interventions and ultimate reduction in
morbidity and mortality).
240. For example, the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation funded a large Public Health Law
Research initiative starting in 2008, to promote the scientific study of the relationship between laws
and legal practices, and population health. Burris et al., supra note 109, at 171.
241. Id. at 172. In other words, they engage in “research.” Id.
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public health policy and law, though a critical step, has historically been
under-emphasized and constitutes a key criterion in the framework for
242
evaluating the success of public health law (Figure 1). Moreover,
evidence included for this translation should be selected with care, based
on some hierarchy of rigor and robustness, to avoid regrettable health
243
policy decisions based on inadequate or misleading research.
1.

Outcome Variables of Interest

Intended outcomes that signify improved public health should be
pre-defined by policymakers based on policy needs and targeted health
risks. Public health targets of interventional laws can be categorized as
primary and secondary outcomes, as described below. Other non-healthrelated or process-oriented benefits of legal interventions may accrue
and are important, such as increased employment or community building
in the process of carrying out the law, but these benefits are ancillary to
244
the main goals of public health regulation. At the forefront of
policymakers’ minds when considering public health regulation should be
245
stated goals of improving population health.

242. See Jonathan E. Fielding et al., How Do We Translate Science into Public Health Policy and
Law?, 30 J.L. Med. & Ethics 22 (2002); see also Kass, supra note 239, at 1780 (noting that due to the
all-too-common situation in which PHLR findings are not translated into policy, benefits can fail to
accrue from the research. Institutional review boards allow research to proceed with the expectation
that a benefit to research subjects or communities will emerge. Without translation into policy, the
risk-to-benefit ratio of the research will rarely weigh in favor of research proceeding). But see Burris &
Anderson, supra note 101, at 107–08 (discussing the influential nature of PHLR on policymaking, in
both a top-down and bottom-up fashion. Research funding so crucial to creating a robust PHLR base,
however, has been disproportionately light in comparison to its wide use and impact). Some of this
policy translation has failed to occur for reasons outside of the effectiveness evidence, such as budget
constraints and public support. See infra Part II.C.; see also Stephanie Zaza et al., Using Science-Based
Guidelines to Shape Public Health Law, 31 J.L. Med. & Ethics (Special Supp.) 65, 66 (2003) (observing
that legislators often shy away from evidence-based decisionmaking simply because they lack the
knowledge to understand the science or because they lack confidence in the actual health benefits and
effectiveness of a proposed intervention); Beverly Gard et al., Connecting Public Health Law with
Science, 32 J.L. Med. & Ethics (Special Supp.) 100, 100 (2004).
243. See Sumit R. Majumdar & Stephen B. Soumerai, “The Unhealthy State of Health Policy
Research,” 28 Health Aff. w900 (2002) (discussing examples where researchers failed to adopt core
principles of study design prerequisite to producing valid evidence, such as in the field of health
information technology, which arguably led to the adoption of ineffective interventions. Worse, such
an evidence-base could lead to the unintended consequence of population harm); see also Stephen B.
Soumerai et al., How Do You Know Which Health Care Effectiveness Research You Can Trust? A
Guide to Study Design for the Perplexed, 12 Preventing Chronic Disease: Pub. Health Research,
Practice & Pol’y 1 (2015).
244. Kass, supra note 239, at 1778. These incidental benefits may play a role in balancing of
benefits and harms when considering whether regulation should be undertaken.
245. Id. (“[A] reduction in morbidity and mortality need not and could not be the goal of every
individual public health intervention or program; however, individual public health programs should
not be undertaken that are not part of a larger package of programs whose combined goal is the
reduction of morbidity and mortality.”).
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Population health improvements can be measured in terms of
primary outcomes or secondary outcomes. Primary outcomes are ideal
measures of public health law effectiveness, as these directly reflect
population health sought to be addressed by the law. Those considered of
value to state policymakers include population-level morbidity and mortality
246
Pre-defined and “clinically significant” improvements in
measures.
primary outcomes typically include reductions in diagnosed illnesses or
deaths. In the PDMP context, primary targeted outcomes that signify
improved health include reduced opioid-related overdoses, substance
abuse treatment admissions, emergency department visits, and rates of
addiction.
Secondary outcomes considered in public health law evaluations
include proximal or intermediate outcomes that lie along the pathways of
effect. Such proxy outcome variables include changes to environments and
247
behaviors that expose individuals to health risks. PDMP proximal
outcomes include changed prescriber and patient behavior, reduced
controlled substance supply, and enhanced law enforcement or other
surveillance activity. Changes in prescribing behavior indicative of reduced
opioid misuse and overdose risk include, for example, lower rates of
248
prescribing of high-morphine-equivalent dosages or less co-prescribing
249
250
of opioids and benzodiazepines. Reduced rates of doctor shopping
and drug diversion reflect changes in patient behaviors and/or law
enforcement activity, from which lowered opioid adverse health effects
theoretically follow.
While primary outcome measures are the ultimate measure of
public health law effectiveness, a focus on intermediate (or secondary)
251
outcomes is often necessary or reasonable for several reasons. First, the
time horizon required to detect changes in population health often can
252
be lengthy, because reduced morbidity and mortality attributable to a
policy take time to manifest and measure. Take opioid misuse, for
instance: Even if a PDMP reduces incident opioid addiction by erecting
appropriate barriers to individuals obtaining prescriptions, reductions in
population-level overdoses and mortality will take some time to manifest

246. Burris et al., supra note 109, at 177–78; Kass, supra note 239, at 1777.
247. Id.
248. Jane A. Baumblatt et al., High-Risk Use by Patients Prescribed Opioids for Pain and Its Role
in Overdose Deaths, 174 JAMA 796 (2014); Nathaniel Katz et al., Usefulness of Prescription
Monitoring Programs for SurveillanceAnalysis of Schedule II Opioid Prescription Data in
Massachusetts, 1996–2006, 19 Pharmacoepidemiology & Drug Safety 115 (2010); Logan et al., supra
note 52; Wilsey et al., supra note 53.
249. Logan et al., supra note 52; Wilsey et al., supra note 53; Dunn et al., supra note 53.
250. See Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, supra note 67, for a definition of “doctor
shopping.”
251. Burris et al., supra note 109, at 177–79.
252. Id.
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because an already-addicted population will continue to experience these
adverse health outcomes in the short-term. Also, ultimate health
outcomes like opioid-related overdoses and hospitalizations are so rare
that they must be observed over some time to detect policy-attributable
changes, if there are any. It is thus more practicable and still telling to
measure changes in prescribing patterns as a proxy for changes in the
environment that ultimately would contribute to reduced opioid-related
adverse health outcomes. Second, because ultimate health outcomes are
often attenuated from laws or policies, understanding mechanisms that
may lead to changes in these outcomes increases confidence that any
effects observed are indeed attributable to a particular intervention.
Access to and measurement of intermediary variables along the causal
pathway avoids exclusive use of sometimes unpersuasive ecological
253
studies, not uncommon to the PHLR literature.
2.

Assessing the Evidence

Policymakers and researchers should explicitly identify the intended
and/or anticipated pathways of effect from law to health outcomes.
Research supporting or refuting aspects of this pathway can be located
254
within a causal model, while gaps in the research base may also become
apparent. But how can regulators identify empirical research worth
including in the evidence base to either support or call into question
public health laws? PHLR can be good science, but this is not true across
the field. Furthermore, some laws lend themselves to evaluation better
255
than others. Principles of research design can be used to guide
policymakerseven those with limited empirical trainingin identifying
256
scientific evidence worth incorporating into policy.
A wide array of research methods are available for studying the
257
258
effects of public health laws, ranging from qualitative research, to
259
260
observational studies, to quasi-experiments, to randomized controlled

253. Burris & Anderson, supra note 101, at 108.
254. See Jeffrey Swanson & Jennifer Ibrahim, Picturing Public Health Law Research: Using Causal
Diagrams to Model and Test Theory, in Public Health Law Research: Theory and Methods 217–36
(eds. Alexander C. Wagenaar & Scott Burris, 1st ed. 2013).
255. Burris & Anderson, supra note 101, at 107–08.
256. Soumerai et al., supra note 243, at 14–15.
257. See generally Swanson & Ibrahim, supra note 254 (discussing the mechanisms, theories, and
models central to public health law research).
258. Robert Drislane & Gary Parkinson, Qualitative Research, Online Dictionary of the Soc. Sci.
(2011), http://bitbucket.icaap.org/dict.pl (defining “qualitative research” as “[r]esearch using methods
such as participant observation or case studies which result in a narrative, descriptive account of a
setting or practice”).
259. William R. Shadish et al., Experimental and Quasi-Experimental Designs for Generalized
Causal Inference 12 (2002) (providing that, synonymous with a correlational study, an observational study
is one “that simply observes the size and direction of a relationship among variables”).
260. Id. (“An experiment in which units are not assigned to conditions randomly.”).
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261

experiments. Study design types within these broad categories of
research can be characterized by the inter-related concepts of rigor,
suitability for causal inference, and capacity to control for common
262
biases.
A simplified hierarchy of designs can assist policymakers (ideally in
coordination with researchers) in organizing PHLR to assess whether
sufficient evidence exists to support law adoption or continued existence.
263
The quantity of evidence is important here, although less so than the
quality of evidence used to determine policy effectiveness and the
generalizability of the evidence to the context in question. Table 2
suggests a way to organize studies, generally arranged from the strongest
to weakest designs for causal inference (that is, to demonstrate that
effects were caused by the policy studied). Randomized controlled
experiments, the “gold-standard” for inferring a causal relationship
264
265
between the law and an outcome, are quite rare in PHLR. Thus,
natural experiments, or those where the intervention is not randomly
266
assigned, are important to consider. The hierarchy presented is by no
means exhaustive of the different types of studies that policymakers may
encounter. Rather, it is intended as a starting point to assist in assessing
the value of PHLR for policy incorporation.

261. Id. (“An experiment in which units are assigned to receive the treatment or an alternative
condition by a random process such as the toss of a coin or a table of random numbers.”).
262. See, e.g., Mello & Zeiler, supra note 102, at 657–62 (providing a helpful catalogue of
methodological approaches to the empirical study of health laws, from strongest to weakest designs,
and also displaying the rating system used by the U.S. Preventive Services Task Force in considering
whether sufficient evidence exists to support a preventive health measure); Soumerai et al., supra note
243, at 15.
263. Kass, supra note 239, at 1778–79 (suggesting that the greater the burdens posed by a program,
the stronger the evidence base must be to support that a program will achieve its stated goals).
264. Because the law is “randomly assigned” to an intervention group and not the comparison
group, the two groups theoretically are comparable on every other dimension. Therefore, the effects
found can be attributed to the intervention rather than confounding variables. Confounding variables
are those that could be related to both the intervention and the outcome variable, and could thus
explain any changes in outcomes observed.
265. Mello & Zeiler, supra note 102, at 660. But see Alan S. Gerber et al., Evaluating Public Health
Law Using Randomized Experiments, in Public Health Law Research: Theory and Methods, supra
note 254, at 283–306.
265. Shadish et al., supra note 259, at 171–206.
266. See Alexander C. Wagenaar & Kelli A. Komro, Natural Experiments: Research Design
Elements for Optimal Causal Inference Without Randomization, in Public Health Law Research:
Theory and Methods, supra note 254, at 307–24.
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Table 2. Hierarchy of Public Health Law Research Designs
Category
Experimental

Design Type
Randomized
controlled
trial

Brief Description
Experiment in
which units are
assigned to receive
a legal intervention
or no intervention
by a random
process (e.g., toss of
a coin or lottery).268

Strengths
 “Gold standard”
of evidence for
identifying causal
relationships.
 If randomization
is successful, the
risk of
unmeasured
confounding
variables is
minimized.

Validity Threats267
 External validity
(i.e.
generalizability
to other contexts,
populations) is
limited.
 Quite rare in
PHLR.

QuasiExperimental

Interrupted
time series

Study that specifies
a time at which an
intervention
occurred to
“interrupt” the prior
situation (e.g., time
at which a law is
effective) and
observes outcomes
over multiple time
points pre- and
post-interruption.269
Stronger design if it
includes a
comparison group
or outcome not
exposed to
interruption.

 Displays
graphically
baseline trends
and any changes
in level or trend
of the outcome
variable at the
time of
interruption in
the intervention
group.

 Co-occurring
interventions or
indeterminate
intervention time
periods threaten
validity.
 Requires
adequate
observations preand postinterruption to
establish
seasonality or
secular trends.

267. Study validity can be characterized in a number of ways. This table and accompanying discussion
focus on internal validity and external validity. “Internal validity” refers to the validity of inferences about
whether observed covariance between treatment (intervention) and outcome variables reflects a causal
relationship. “External validity” refers to the validity of inferences about whether the cause-effect
relationship holds over variation in persons, settings, treatment variables, and measurement variables.
Shadish et al., supra note 259.
268. Id. at 12–13.
269. Id. at 171–206.
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Design Type
Regression
discontinuity

Brief Description
Study participants
are assigned to a
condition (e.g.,
health insurance
coverage) on the
basis of a cutoff
score (e.g., income).
Outcome variable is
measured before
and after
assignment.270

Strengths
 Minimizes
differences (i.e.,
confounders)
between groups,
but for the cutoff
score.

Validity Threats267
 Possible
manipulation of
the cutoff criteria
(e.g., lying about
income).
 Generalizable
only to
populations close
to the cutoff.

Differenceindifferences
(or)
controlled
pre-post

Study that compares
outcomes before
and after the
intervention in a
group exposed to an
intervention
compared to a
group not exposed.

 Minimizes
concern that
effects merely
reflect secular
trends.

 Not accounting
for differing
baseline trends of
groups.271

Uncontrolled
pre-post

Study measures
outcome variable
before and after the
intervention, but
without a
comparison group.
Stronger design
adjusts for potential
confounding
variables (i.e., uses
multivariate
regression).272

 Can rule out that
effects are caused
by other
confounding
variables rather
than the law of
interest by
including these
variables in the
model.

 Cannot rule out
that secular
changes in the
environment may
introduce
confounding
variables
responsible for
effects.

270. Id. at 207–43.
271. Soumerai et al., supra note 243, at 15.
272. Mello & Zeiler, supra note 102, at 659–60; Soumerai et al., supra note 243, at 15.
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Category

Design Type
Crosssectional
designs

Brief Description
Study is descriptive
only, measuring
outcome variable at
one point in time
after the
intervention (i.e., no
baseline measure).
Stronger designs
adjust for
confounding
variables (i.e., use
multivariate, instead
of univariate or
bivariate
regression).273

Strengths
 Can describe the
relationship
between two
variables.
Precision in the
measure of this
relationship is
enhanced if other
variables that
relate to both
(i.e.,
confounders) are
included in the
model.

Validity Threats267
 No baseline
measure(s) to
provide a basis
for comparison to
outcome
measures after
the intervention,
so no causeeffect
relationship can
be identified.

Qualitative

Surveys,
interviews,
focus groups

Systematic content
analysis (and
sometimes
quantitative
analysis) of
questions answered
by multiple study
participants.

 Can provide rich
context to the
factors affecting
policy
effectiveness.

 Subjective and
susceptible to
response bias.274
 Not generalizable
given typically
small sample
sizes.

Case studies

Description of
policy intervention
experience using a
particular example
or set of examples.

 Can provide rich
information about
particular
example(s) of
policy
effectiveness.275

 Example(s)
selected may be
unique and not
generalizable to
other contexts.276

In addition to the above categories of designs for individual studies,
other types of research aim to aggregate the findings of multiple primary
studies and may be very valuable to policymakers. Systematic reviews
use explicit methods to identify and critically review research relating to
a particular outcome or set of outcomes and evaluate the strength of
277
their findings to arrive at a general conclusion about the literature.
Meta-analyses apply quantitative statistical analyses to pool and analyze
findings from different studies to arrive at effect estimates of similar
278
interventions across the literature. There are certain collaborative
entities, such as the Cochrane Collaboration, Campbell Collaboration, and
The Community Guide (of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention)
pioneering the work in these areas, although relatively few systematic-type

273.
274.
275.
276.
277.
278.

Mello & Zeiler, supra note 102, at 658–60.
Id. at 658.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 661; Moulton et al., supra note 234, at 17.
Id.
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reviews are available relative to the numerous and varied types of public
279
health laws in existence. Finally, “comparative effectiveness” studies do
not necessarily encompass a specific study design type, but are defined as
those that compare methods to “prevent, treat, and monitor a clinical
condition or to improve the delivery of care,” and to inform
280
decisionmaking by policymakers, among others. This definition can
potentially include head-to-head comparisons of community- and
population-level interventions to improve health conditions, such public
281
health law approaches to treating prescription opioid misuse.
Comparative effectiveness research, although in its infancy in the United
282
States, is enjoying substantial federal funding and may be increasingly
available and relevant to public health policymaking in the future.
3.

PDMP Effectiveness

The body of research investigating PDMP effectiveness is beginning
to generate information about whether these policies impact opioidrelated primary health outcomes or proximal outcomes. Although the
literature is growing and of a respectable size, many studies are not
rigorous enough to warrant policy incorporation or replication, when
compared against the hierarchy of research designs presented in Table 2.
Several more recent studies, though, use long-term data from multiple
states and assess specific PDMP features to draw conclusions about
PDMP impacts. As these kinds of stronger studies proliferate, a clearer
sense of PDMP effectiveness will emerge.
The Appendix Table catalogs key studies of PDMPs that shed light
283
on identified primary and secondary outcomes. The Table summarizes
the results of a search of social science and medical peer-reviewed
284
literature for studies that measure the effects of state-based, electronic

279. See Moulton et al., supra note 234, at 17, for a detailed discussion and catalogue of systematic
reviews available for interventional public health laws, as well as identification of notable gaps in the
field; see also Mello & Zeiler, supra note 102, at 661.
280. Jane Hyatt Thorpe, Comparative Effectiveness Research and Health Reform: Implications for
Public Health Policy and Practice, 125 Pub. Health Rep. 909, 909 (2010) (quoting the Institute of
Medicine’s definition of comparative effectiveness research).
281. Id.
282. Id. at 909–10.
283. See supra Part II.B.1 for identification of these outcomes.
284. The helpfulness of unpublished PDMP evaluations, such as those conducted internally by
states, for informing policy is limited by the widespread use of uncontrolled designs (that is, the studies
fail to include a comparison group for reference when evaluating a particular PDMP) and contexts
which are difficult to generalize across states. Further, these evaluations are not subject to the peerreview process. Also, evaluations of PDMPs in other countries, most notably Canada, are not included
in the literature presented. Extrapolating results from these studies presents numerous challenges
given differing health care systems, prescribing norms, patient behaviors, and PDMP features. See
Yoko Murphy et al., Prescription Opioid Use, Harms and Interventions in Canada: A Review Update of
New Developments and Findings Since 2010, 18 Pain Physician E605, E610–E611 (2015).
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285

PDMPs. Included in the Table are the published analyses that employ
quasi-experimental and observational designs (see Table 2). Although
this review does not focus on them, qualitative studies can offer further
insights into the relationship between PDMPs and health outcomes, and
should supplement policymaker considerations. The Appendix Table
should not be considered exhaustive of research bearing on PDMPs, but
it includes the best candidate studies currently available for drawing
causal inferences about the public health effects of PDMPs.
Although some have interpreted the PDMP literature as providing
286
287
strong evidence of program effectiveness, the story is far from clear.
We still lack a robust understanding of whether PDMPs reduce opioidrelated overdose deaths, the ultimate health outcome of interest. The
best available study uses national mortality data from the Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention to find no association between PDMPs
288
and overdose mortality. However, the data used is somewhat outdated
(1999–2005) and spans over a period when PDMPs were not very
289
robust. On the other hand, states with PDMPs do seem to experience
fewer opioid-related treatment admissions and poisonings, based on two
290
These analyses used national
strong quasi-experimental studies.
poisoning and treatment admission data cumulatively spanning from
1997 through 2009 and characterized states of study based on the

285. There is a decent-sized body of literature on paper PDMPs, particularly focusing on their
impact on benzodiazepine prescribing. However, this literature is not included in Appendix Table
because paper PDMPs were a substantially different intervention from electronic PDMPs and were
implemented during a different prescribing era. This literature thus may have limited generalizability
to electronic PDMPs. See Tamara M. Haegerich et al., What We Know, and Don’t Know, About the
Impact of State Policy and Systems-Level Interventions on Prescription Drug Overdose, 145 Drug &
Alcohol Dependence 34, 37–38 (2014), for a summary of these paper PDMP studies.
286. See, e.g. Prescription Drug Monitoring Program Ctr. of Excellence at Brandeis, supra
note 69, at 3; Julie Worley, Prescription Drug Monitoring Programs, a Response to Doctor Shopping:
Purpose, Effectiveness, and Directions for Future Research, 33 Issues in Mental Health Nursing 319,
326 (2012).
287. See Haegerich et al., supra note 285, at 37–38 (presenting an astute but limited review of the
PDMP evaluation literature from 1946–2014. The authors conclude that “later studies . . . have not
clearly established significant effects on total opioid prescribing or health outcomes with PDMPs. The
largest limitation is the lack of detailed data on prescribing volume and patterns prior to PDMP
implementation, which forced the use of cross-section, observational study designs. The effect sizes in
the most recent studies have been small, making it conceivable that the differences are due to
unaddressed confounding variables. There is yet little data to settle the question of whether specific
actions of PDMPs (e.g., proactive reporting) add to their effectiveness.”). No rigorous systematic
reviews study PDMP effects.
288. See Leonard J. Paulozzi et al., Prescription Drug Monitoring Programs and Death Rates from
Drug Overdose, 12 Pain Med. 747 (2011).
289. Id.
290. Liza M. Reifler et al., Do Prescription Monitoring Programs Impact State Trends in Opioid
Abuse/Misuse?, 13 Pain Med. 434 (2012); Richard M. Reisman et al., Prescription Opioid Usage and Abuse
Relationships: An Evaluation of State Prescription Drug Monitoring Program Efficacy, 3 Substance Abuse:
Res. & Treatment 41 (2009).
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291

presence or absence of a PDMP. Reifler et al. went a step further and
conducted sub-analyses of “superior” PDMP featuresfor example,
program was in effect for a long time, sent unsolicited reports, and
292
monitored comprehensive drug schedulesto find consistent results.
Although further study of all primary health outcomes is warranted,
these studies suggest that PDMPs are at least associated with decreased
poisonings and admissions.
However, the mechanism of effect (or secondary outcomes) to
explain reduced treatment admissions and poisonings is uncertain. The
literature findings are mixed as to whether state PDMPs reduce opioid
supply or prescribing. Several quasi-experimental studies use national
opioid supply data spanning 1997 through 2008 to draw different
conclusions regarding whether PDMPs are associated with reduced
supply. Another quasi-experimental study conducted by Rutkow et al.
found that Florida’s (voluntary) PDMP and pill mill law combined to
drive modest decreases in total opioid fills and morphine concentration
per dose (but not days’ supply of drugs) among the highest baseline users
293
and prescribers, respectively. This strong analysis nevertheless suffers
from an imperfect comparison stateGeorgia, which had much lower
prescribing at baselineand an inability to isolate PDMP effects from
294
those of another intervention. Weaker observational studies have
drawn mixed conclusions about the effect of PDMPs on prescribing
behavior and typically include small sample sizes, which limit their
295
generalizability. Finally, there is very little evidence to suggest that
PDMPs reduce doctor shopping or diversion, given that the few studies
available on these outcomes do not lend themselves to causal
296
inference.
Although the evidence base in support of PDMPs is growing, it
requires significant further exploration and rigor. Weaknesses in the

291. Id.
292. Reifler et al., supra note 290.
293. See Rutkow et al., supra note 167.
294. Id.
295. See David F. Baehren et al., A Statewide Prescription Monitoring Program Affects Emergency
Department Prescribing Behaviors, 56 Annals Emergency Med. 19 (2010); Chris Ringwalt et al., The
Effects of North Carolina’s Prescription Drug Monitoring Program on the Prescribing Behaviors of the
State’s Providers, 36 J. Primary Prevention 131 (2015); Matthew W. McAllister et al., Impact of
Prescription Drug-Monitoring Program on Controlled Substance Prescribing in the ED, 33 Am. J.
Emergency Med. 781 (2015); Scott G. Weiner et al., Clinician Impression Versus Prescription Drug
Monitoring Program Criteria in the Assessment of Drug-Seeking Behavior in the Emergency Department,
62 Annals Emergency Med. 281 (2013).
296. See, e.g., Linda Simoni-Wastila & Jingjing Qian, Influence of Prescription Monitoring
Programs on Analgesic Utilization by an Insured Retiree Population, 21 Pharmacoepidemiology &
Drug Safety 1261 (2012); Hilary L. Surratt et al., Reductions in Prescription Opioid Diversion
Following Recent Legislative Interventions in Florida, 23 Pharmacoepidemiology & Drug Safety 314
(2014).
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literature are numerous. First, many of the more rigorous studies were
conducted during a period when PDMPs were much weaker
policiesfor instance, through the early 2000s, programs typically
monitored only Schedule II substances and were seldom queriedand
thus need updating. Second, most studies are not rigorous, with no
randomized controlled trials and few quasi-experimental studies
available. Many studies also lack a comparison group, fail to measure
outcomes before a policy went into effect, or include small sample sizes.
Third, studies typically do not adequately account for many other, cooccurring prescription drug misuse policy interventions (such as pill mill
laws, or opioid drug reformulations), and thus could falsely attribute
effects to PDMPs instead of to these policies. Finally, mixed results could
be attributable to divergent PDMP policies, which are typically not
carefully characterized in studies. Studies could do a much better job of
differentiating the PDMP interventions based on policy strength.
A major drawback in PDMP studies, moreover, is the typical failure
to account for actual levels of PDMP use by prescribers, which is still
297
thought to be quite low. The median PDMP registration rate among
providers who issued at least one controlled substance prescription was
298
thirty-five percent from 2009–2012, and not all enrolled prescribers
regularly query PDMPs. A recent national study found that only fiftythree percent of primary care physicians reportedly use their state’s
299
PDMP. Although studies do suggest that PDMP awareness is high and
300
that use is increasing over time, database queries are still sufficiently
low that not incorporating this measure into studies may dilute any
potential findings of effect. Also, further investigation is required into
whether targeting increased use among a subset of high-volume

297. But see Ringwalt et al., supra note 295; Chris Delcher et al., Abrupt Decline in OxycodoneCaused Mortality After Implementation of Florida’s Prescription Drug Monitoring Program, 150 Drug
& Alcohol Dependence 63 (2015) (incorporating a measure of PDMP queries into the intervention
variable).
298. Peter Kreiner et al., Bureau of Justice Assistance Prescription Drug Monitoring
Program Performance Measures Report: January 2009 through June 2012 (2013). The percentage
of prescribers who registered with the program (among prescribers who issued at least one controlled
substance prescription in the prior three months) from 2009–2012 ranged from one to eighty-two
percent based on the state. Id. at 15–16.
299. Lainie Rutkow et al., Most Primary Care Physicians Are Aware of Prescription Drug
Monitoring Programs, But Many Find the Data Difficult to Access, 34 Health Aff. 484, 487 (2015).
300. See, e.g., Jeanmarie Perrone et al., Prescribing Practices, Knowledge, and Use of Prescription
Drug Monitoring Programs (PDMP) by a National Sample of Medical Toxicologists, 8 J. Med.
Toxicology 341 (2012); Lance Feldman et al., Awareness and Utilization of a Prescription Monitoring
Program Among Physicians, 13 J. Pain & Palliative Care Pharmacotherapy 908 (2011); Lance
Feldman et al., Influencing Controlled Substance Prescribing: Attending and Resident Physician Use of
a State Prescription Monitoring Program, 13 J. Pain Med. 908 (2012); Kirstin Barrett & Ashby Watson,
Physician Perspectives on a Pilot Prescription Monitoring Program, 19 J. Pain & Palliative Care
Pharmacotherapy 5 (2005).
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prescribers, rather than all physicians or controlled substance prescribers,
is warranted.
Because so many varied PDMPs have been implemented,
policymakers and researchers should now look to evidence from multi301
state, retrospective, comparative evaluations of their effectiveness. This
evidence base needs to be updated, using longer-term data from before and
after program implementation, now that sufficient time has passed since
electronic PDMPs were implemented in many jurisdictions. Identifying
appropriate comparison jurisdictions to enable quasi-experimental designs is
somewhat of a challenge, given that forty-nine states have adopted their own
PDMPs. Thus, time variation in PDMP adoption or implementation of
certain features offers opportunities for comparative studies. For instance,
the impact of relatively recent “strong” PDMP mandates on reduced opioid
prescribing (requiring that prescribers check the systems regularly) shows
302
promise in the handful of states that have adopted this policy lever, but
requires additional empirical support. Also, comparison outcomes offer
new avenues. For example, researchers can compare opioid prescribing
for acute pain or headaches (indications where opioids have been shown
to have limited utility) versus that for cancer (where opioid prescribing
receives little scrutiny). One would hypothesize that PDMPs would
reduce opioid prescribing in the former case, but not the latter.
The literature would benefit from a greater interdisciplinary focus
by incorporating prescribers, pharmacists, program administrators, law
experts, and health services researchers into informing and designing
studies. Prescribers and pharmacists can provide clinical expertise
germane to generating hypotheses about which PDMP features are likely
to impact prescribing behavior, and to identifying appropriate comparison
outcomes (see above example). Law experts can assist in categorizing
PDMPs as robust or weak for comparison purposes, based on assessment
of their policy features or enforcement. Policymakers can identify key
outcomes of interest with regard to PDMP effectiveness. Program
administrators can provide PDMP data for study and an understanding
of the operational particulars of the programs, such as user-ship. And
health services researchers can help to design the best studies feasible
using available data.

301. Twenty PDMPs currently require that evaluations be reported to the legislature at least
annually regarding the effectiveness of the programs and how they are impacting prescribing. Nat’l
All. for Model State Drug Laws, supra note 68, at 11. These types of reporting requirements would
offer a prime opportunity for policymakers to work with researchers and program administrators to
enhance the evidence base, particularly by conducting studies using comparison states or comparison
outcomes.
302. Linda Rasubala et al., Impact of Mandatory Prescription Drug Monitoring Program on
Prescription of Opioid Analgesics by Dentists, 10 PLOS ONE 1 (2015) (discussing a strong assessment
of the New York i-STOP mandate’s impact on opioid prescribing among dentists). See Haffajee et al.,
supra note 70.
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Finally, comparative effectiveness studies that compare PDMPs to
other state interventions targeting opioid misuse, such as pill mill laws or
access to opioid antagonists, would provide timely information to
regulators regarding how to best invest their limited resources to tackle
prescription opioid misuse. If PDMPs are implemented concurrently with
other interventions, as was the case in Florida where PDMPs and other
policies were pursued in quick succession, it may be practically difficult to
separate out PDMP independent effects, and thus co-effects that are less
303
generalizable to other jurisdictions must be considered. Exploration into
all these areas would assist policymakers to most effectively address
prescription drug misuse and would serve to facilitate decisions regarding
whether to retain, amend, or abandon PDMPs.
C. Ethical Considerations
A third broad inquiry for state policymakers asks whether ethical
objections advise against public health law implementation or perpetuation.
Even if a policy falls within the appropriate legal parameters for state
action and seems likely, or is proven, to be effective in addressing the
public health problem, there may be ethical objections that, if substantial,
should bar its implementation or continued existence.
The community-level focus of public health calls for a set of
justificatory considerations distinct from those used in clinical medical
settings where the treatment and cure of individual patients are
304
paramount. Instead, public health is primarily concerned with the wellbeing of populations, the broader social and environmental determinants
305
of health, and prevention of ill societal health. Public health ethics
frameworks that are practice-based emerged from an explicit recognition
of these distinguishing features and unique moral considerations in public

303. See Rutkow et al., supra note 299 (studying the interactive effects of the Florida PDMP law
and pill mill laws on opioid prescribing and total opioid volume). But see Delcher et al., supra note 297
(attempting to “control” for three co-interventions that impacted Floridaincluding the Florida pill
mill law, DEA pill mill crackdown, and OxyContin reformulationin the multivariate regression
model).
304. Kass, supra note 239, at 1776 (“[C]odes of medical and research ethics generally give high
priority to individual autonomy, a priority that cannot be assumed to be appropriate for public health
practice. . . . A framework of ethics is needed, both to provide practical guidance for public health
professionals and to highlight the defining values of public health, values that differ in morally relevant
ways from values that define clinical practice and research.”). See Lisa M. Lee, Public Health Ethics
Theory: Review and Paths to Convergence, 34 J. L. Med. & Ethics 85, 87 (2012); James F. Childress et
al., Public Health Ethics: Mapping the Terrain, 30 J.L. Med. & Ethics 170, 170 (2002); Ross E.G.
Upshur, Principles for the Justification of Public Health Intervention, 93 Canadian J. Pub. Health 101,
101 (2002).
305. Upshur, supra note 304, at 101. The Institute of Medicine has defined public health as “what
we, as a society, do collectively to assure the conditions in which people can be healthy.” Inst. of
Med., The Future of Public Health 19 (1988).
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306

health. Rather than try to provide a comprehensive philosophical
approach to public health in practice, they rely upon the foundational
307
values of rights (positive and negative) and social justice. Specifically, a
code of public health ethics should emphasize the negative rights of
citizens to noninterference, affirmative societal obligations to improve
the health of the overall population, and the need to fulfill these
308
obligations with special focus on the needs of the most disadvantaged.
The principles proposed provide practical guidance for practitioners faced
309
with public health-related ethical quandaries, including policymakers
310
implementing public health laws.
311
312
Public health ethics principles set forth by Kass and Childress
provide useful guideposts for the ethical implementation of public health
laws. These conditions do not explicitly include, but instead complement
and assume, favorable performance under those criteria already set forth
herein (that is, the legal permissibility and effectiveness of a law designed
313
to address a significant public health threat). Although not an exact
algorithm to resolve conflicts between the goal of public health and other
moral considerations, the following ethical conditions can help guide
determinations about the appropriateness of public health interventions,
and include: (1) proportionality; (2) minimal infringement; (3) fairness;
314
and (4) public accountability. A brief discussion of the principles follows,
and each is applied to the PDMP contextalthough it is important to bear

306. Id.
307. Lee, supra note 304, at 87–90; Kass, supra note 239, at 1777.
308. Kass, supra note 239, at 1777; Gostin, supra note 101, at 10–11 (discussing the social justice
moral impulses that animate public health: (1) to advance human well-being by improving health; and
(2) to do so by particularly focusing on the needs of the most disadvantaged. To satisfy these aims
succeeds in bringing the good of health to all members of the population).
309. Lee, supra note 304, at 87–88.
310. Kass, supra note 239, at 1777 (“Indeed, it is in great part because such power is vested in
public health by law that a code or framework of ethics designed specifically for public health is so
very important.”).
311. See id.
312. Childress et al., supra note 304.
313. Several of the justificatory conditions included in public health ethics frameworks proposed
by other scholars actually overlap with legal requirements set forth in Part II.A supra, and the general
requirement of effectiveness set forth in Part II.B supra. For example, James Childress et al. require
that a public health policy be necessary, effective, and minimally infringing. Childress et al., supra note
304, at 173. Nancy Kass requires that a public health policy be effective at reducing mortality and
morbidity and minimally infringing. Kass, supra note 239, at 1778–80. Richard Upshur requires that
the program be minimally restrictive. Upshur, supra note 304, at 102. Minimal infringement is included
in the present framework as an ethical principle because, depending on the type of policy, the law
requires varying degrees of inquiry into the level of infringement and whether less restrictive
alternatives are available. By including minimal infringement as an ethical principle, an inquiry must
be made into the reasonableness of the intrusiveness of the law, not merely whether an obviously less
restrictive means is available. See infra Part II.A.1.
314. Childress et al., supra note 304, at 173.
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in mind that every state PDMP is unique and must be assessed on a caseby-case basis.
1.

Proportionality

First, it is critical to demonstrate that the benefits of a public health law
315
outweigh the costs or infringements associated with its implementation.
Proportionality requires the weighing of societal benefits against burdens, in
order to help assess whether a particular law is the best use of available
316
resources. There are two dimensions of proportionality: one that considers
societal benefits against individual burdens and another that considers
societal benefits against societal burdens. Individual burdens, such as liberty
and privacy, will be further addressed below in the discussion of “minimal
317
infringement.” The societal benefits of PDMPs include changes in the
primary and secondary outcomes outlined above: Reducing opioid-related
adverse health outcomes, improving prescribing, and reducing diversion or
doctor shopping. Societal benefits also include reduced expenditures
associated with prescription drug misuse, as well as more intangible but
potentially substantial benefits associated with reduced unemployment,
absenteeism, and family disruption. Illicit drug use (a large percentage of
which involves opioids) costs our nation $11 billion in health care costs and
318
$193 billion annually overall some of which expenditure could be saved
if PDMPs work to curb this practice.
Societal burdens considered should include government costs of
implementation and enforcement, as well as the opportunity costs of
expending government and private resources, including political capital,
instead of pursuing other policies to achieve the same ends. PDMPs are
expensive to implement and finding the money to implement them has
proven a challenge. Programs are funded by a combination of federal
funds, private funds, and state-raised revenues, but often operate at

315. Id.
316. Two tools may be useful to policymakers for comparing costs to benefits. Cost-benefit analysis
quantifies the costs and benefits of a course of action, comparing them using the same metric (often monetary
value). Trying to quantify the benefits of a course of action can be challenging and controversial. Thus, in
health interventions, cost-effectiveness analysis is often favored. Cost-effectiveness analysis divides the
impact of a program (such as the percentage reduction in new cases of opioid addiction) by the cost of the
program, generating a statistic termed the “cost-effectiveness ratio” (“CER”). CERs can be compared as
between different policy interventions or programs. Abdul Latif Jameel, Introduction to Evaluations: CostBenefit/Effectiveness/Comparison Analyses, J-PAL, https://www.povertyactionlab.org/methodology/whatevaluation/cost-benefiteffectivenesscomparison-analyses (last visited Aug. 5, 2016). For further discussion of
concepts and benefits of cost-effectiveness analysis for use by policymakers, see World Health Org.,
Making Choices in Health: WHO Guide to Cost-Effectiveness Analysis (T. Tan-Torres Edejer et al.,
eds., 2003), http://www.who.int/choice/publications/p_2003_generalised_cea.pdf.
317. Individual burdens are the focus of James Childress et al.’s discussion of the proportionality
principle. See Childress et al., supra note 304, at 173–76.
318. The Science of Drug Abuse & Addiction: Trends and Statistics, Nat’l Inst. on Drug Abuse
(2015), https://www.drugabuse.gov/related-topics/trends-statistics (last visited Aug. 5, 2016).
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319

impaired capacity when money issues arise. The programs are complex
to operatefrom the technical components (software is usually
proprietary and owned by contracted software vendors) to ensuring
confidentiality of information, to checking the accuracy of data inputted by
dispensers, to promoting or enforcing use by prescribers, to facilitating
optimal law enforcement use of the data. Substantial resources are
required to facilitate these tasks. In the current environment, PDMPs
constitute the dominant state approach to addressing prescription drug
misuse, perhaps at the opportunity cost of investing money and political
capital into other opioid misuse prevention efforts. In order to justify
these societal costs, the health benefits and cost savings will need to be
explicitly proven.
Moreover, unintended effectsboth negative and positiveof
regulation on population health outcomes or on non-health outcomes
should be included in the calculus. There may be substantial negative
unintended effects of PDMPs on populations, the extent of which are
currently unknown. Although a few studies have suggested that electronic
320
PDMPs will not have a “chilling” effect on appropriate prescribing,
whether PDMPs lead some prescribers to cut back on or discontinue
appropriate controlled substance prescribing, thereby exacerbating the
under-treatment of pain epidemic or other maladies, remains to be seen.
Studies of older paper PDMPs found that prescribers did, indeed, cut
back on appropriate benzodiazepine prescribing, particularly among
321
racial minorities albeit this was a somewhat different, more forceful
intervention than most electronic PDMPs. Some studies of early
electronic PDMPs detected substitution from monitored (Schedule II) to
322
non-monitored (Schedule III) opioids, which lends support to the
possibility that PDMPs could change pain management treatment and
possibly compromise clinical care. Differentiating between appropriate
and inappropriate opioid prescribing, as well as how to best use PDMPs
to identify doctor shoppers and diverters, places a substantial onus on
prescribers (and pharmacists) in an area where clinical disagreements
abound. Also, if opioid addicts are denied pills because prescribers check
PDMPs, then they may turn in increasing numbers to heroina

319. Prescription Drug Monitoring Program Training & Tech. Assistance Ctr., Brandeis Univ.,
Technical Assistance Guide No. 04-13: Funding Options for Prescription Drug Monitoring
Programs, (2013), http://www.pdmpassist.org/pdf/PDMP_Funding_Options_TAG.pdf.
320. See Baehren et al., supra note 295; Ringwalt et al., supra note 295.
321. Dennis Ross-Degnan et al., A Controlled Study of the Effects of State Surveillance on
Indicators of Problematic and Non-problematic Benzodiazepine Use in a Medicaid Population, 34 Int’l
J. Psychiatry Med. 103 (2004); Sallie-Anne Pearson et al., Racial Disparities in Access After
Regulatory Surveillance of Benzodiazepines, 166 Archives Internal Med. 572 (2006).
322. See Paulozzi et al., supra note 288; Simoni-Wastila & Qian, supra note 296.
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perverse, negative public health ramification. Many of these potential
unintended consequences of PDMPs are substantial: Research should
investigate whether they occur, and safety mechanisms should be
instituted to prevent their matriculation. For instance, if opioid addicts
are denied prescription drugs, addiction treatment options should be
recommended and made available so that they are less likely to turn to
heroin.
2.

Minimal Infringement

As a corollary to the proportionality requirement, policymakers
should seek to minimally infringe upon private interests and adopt the
least restrictive means available. This ethical requirement can be viewed
as complementary to the legal standards described in Part II.A.1 (and in
some cases, of a higher threshold). This condition recognizes that there
may be a number of means to achieving a public health end, and the least
restrictive one should be favoredparticularly when using powerful police
powers that are presumptively coercive, the unintended consequences of
324
which may be ill understood. Individual burdens or harms typically will
fall into three categories: (1) risks to privacy and confidentiality; (2) risks
to liberty and self-determination; and (3) risks to justice (which will be
325
further addressed as a fairness consideration below). Even where a
public health law may appear to restrict an individual’s liberty, its potential
to enhance the liberty of other individuals warrants consideration, as
326
positive externalities of public health laws abound.
PDMPs impose serious individual burdens on prescribers and
patients. PDMP infringements on prescribers in their clinical practice are
not insignificant, and prescribers have shown resistance to using PDMPs.
Commonly cited prescriber objections to use include concerns about
compromised patient satisfaction ratings (if checking a PDMP results in
delays or denial of controlled substance prescriptions), unreimbursed
time associated with using the program, burdensome enrollment
procedures, cumbersome systems, and the information being viewed as
327
unnecessary, incomplete, inaccurate, and/or untimely. To minimally

323. See Leo Beletsky, As Heroin Deaths Skyrocket, Prescription Monitoring Programs May Do More
Harm, Huffington Post (Mar. 18, 2015), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/leo-beletsky/as-heroin-deathsskyrocket-prescription-monitoring-programs-may-do-more-harm_b_6883944.html.
324. Upshur, supra note 304, at 102.
325. Kass, supra note 239, at 1779 (discussing the burdens more or less likely to arise from different
public health activities). Regulations and legislation rank among the most intrusive approaches to public
healththey are coercive because they typically impose penalties for noncompliance. Id.
326. Parmet, supra note 109, at 405.
327. Deyo et al., supra note 76.
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infringe upon prescribers and the physician-patient relationship, these
barriers should be reasonably addressed, for example, by automatically
329
enrolling prescribers, improving integration into clinical workflow, and
making data complete through frequent updates and interstate sharing (at
least among neighboring states). Physicians should not be required to log
into multiple, cumbersome systems, particularly absent reimbursement for
330
their time.
Use mandates adopted in twenty-two states raise a particularly
interesting quandary: They infringe substantially on physicians, but they
seem to increase use and possibly reduce opioid prescribing volume and
misuse. Robust evidence, therefore, should be generated from within
states that have enacted strong mandates (such as New York and
Tennessee) to justify this policy lever before it is more universally adopted
331
given significant prescriber objections. At the same time, PDMP features
that serve to dis-incentivize prescribers from checking the systems, such as
laws that explicitly provide prescriber immunity from liability for failure to
332
333
check or exemption from any obligation to query the systems, should
be abandoned to send the message that PDMPs ought to be checked
frequently when prescribing monitored substances.
Infringements on prescribers and patients can also be substantial if
their private prescription data are disclosed and/or used for law enforcement
or regulatory purposes. As discussed in Part II.A, allowing law enforcement
and licensing boards unfettered access to PDMP datanamely, to identify
high-volume prescribers, doctor shoppers, or diverters absent a court-issued
warrant or subpoenatoes the line, legally speaking. As an ethical matter,
even if the law allows wide access in certain jurisdictions, patients and
prescribers arguably should be afforded heightened privacy protections to
allow uninhibited doctor-patient decisionmaking to occur. Also, strict data
security protections, particularly when information flows across states, are
necessary to minimize confidentiality concerns felt by opioid prescribers and
334
patients. These include robust technological protections and penalties for
disclosure by PDMP authorized users.
Effective PDMPs are likely to benefit third parties, despite other
liberty infringements. Preventing addiction facilitates the enjoyment of

328. See Steven E. Weinberger et al., Legislative Interference with the Patient-Physician Relationship,
367 New Eng. J. Med. 1557 (2012) (citing other examples of doctor-patient interferences, such as
restrictions on discussions about gun safety imposed in some states).
329. Twenty-one states currently require prescribers and dispensers to register with the PDMP.
Nat’l All. for Model State Drug Laws, supra note 68, at 39.
330. See Haffajee et al., supra note 70.
331. Id.
332. Twenty-five states provide such immunity. Nat’l. All. for Model State Drug Laws, supra
note 68, at 38.
333. Sixteen states absolve prescribers from any obligation to check PDMPs. Id. at 37.
334. See infra Part II.A.4 for PDMP security recommendations.
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certain liberties by others, such as avoiding the burden of being exposed
to prescription opioids (which increases the likelihood of using and
abusing drugs); avoiding caring for, watching suffer, or losing a family
member or friend; avoiding exposure to HIV or other diseases spread by
335
sharing infected needles; and avoiding increases in health insurance
premiums (or taxes for public programs) generated by the costs of
336
opioid-related hospitalizations or outpatient visits. These benefits
suggest that a balance must be struck between making PDMPs minimally
intrusive on individual liberties and making them effectiveas
mentioned in the mandate discussion above.
3.

Fairness
337

A public health law should satisfy a basic requirement of fairness.
Although fairness can be articulated using a number of different ethical
338
frameworks, this discussion centers on the distributive justice theory
339
originally conceived by John Rawls, which calls for the equitable
distribution of benefits and costs among populations and communities.
340
Kass and Gostin both ground fairness in distributive justice. According
to Kass’s framework, distributive justice in public health obligates the
government to ensure that interventions address the health of the least
advantaged; Gostin goes a step further to assert that the negative
consequences of interventions do not fall disproportionately on the least
341
advantaged. Because the least advantaged are more vulnerable to
public health threats as well as least likely to enjoy other social
342
determinants of health, they arguably deserve special attention.
In the case of prescription opioid misuse, the least advantaged in
society (as measured by socioeconomic status, for example) are more
likely to lack robust education about the science and risks of addiction;
335. See Abby Goodnough, Rural Indiana Struggles to Contend with H.I.V. Outbreak, N.Y Times (May
5, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/06/us/rural-indiana-struggles-to-contend-with-hiv-outbreak.
html?_r=0.
336. See, e.g., Dr. Holm, Harm from Drug Abuse Extends Beyond the Illicit User, Rapid City J. (Aug.
3, 2015), http://rapidcityjournal.com/harm-from-drug-abuse-extends-beyond-the-illicit-user/article_95a5e18cfc7c-5386-a946-e74b078b82be.html (suggesting that harms extending beyond the user include “increased
crime and violence, child and spouse abuse, motor vehicle accidents, sexually spread diseases, fetal
malformations in children, and deaths due to accidental and intentional overdose”).
337. Some of the fairness concepts presented in this Part resemble those of equal protection
required under the Constitution, briefly discussed supra Part II.A.3, which aims to protect those
groups subjected to historical discrimination. This ethical inquiry is somewhat broader, however, and
does not identify specific classes of persons particularly deserving of protection.
338. For example, prioritarian or utilitarian frameworks can also be adopted, depending on
societal conceptions of fairness.
339. See John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (1971).
340. Kass, supra note 239, at 1780–81 (noting that this requirement is particularly important if an
intervention is restrictive).
341. Gostin, supra note 101, at 11.
342. Id.
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switch to cheaper and more easily accessed heroin when prescription pills
are no longer available; have limited treatment options for addiction and
overdose (such as naloxone access; substance abuse treatment); and lack
access to social and other support services to address addiction and its
consequences (such as access to clean needles). These considerations
mean that PDMPs may be necessary to reduce inequalities, but also that
any unintended negative consequences should not disproportionately fall
upon the less advantaged. The paper triplicate form of prescription
monitoring that preceded electronic PDMPs reduced problematic, as
343
well as non-problematic, benzodiazepine use, and had disproportionate
344
under-prescribing impacts in minority communities. The potential for
these unintended consequences of electronic PDMPs should be closely
monitored, to see if, for example, certain demographic groups are
targeted as potential “doctor shoppers” and prescribed to less often as a
result of these programs. Education and guidelines should accompany
prescriber use of the systems to promote standardized and conscientious
use of the data in a way that promotes good health and does not
exacerbate social inequalities.
4.

Public Accountability

Finally, the government should strive to be accountable to the
public when implementing health laws on their behalf. Any public health
law will infringe on some private interests and impose some social cost,
and thus should be explained and justified to parties impacted.
Policymaking transparency respects stakeholders as moral equals who
345
deserve to be involved in the decisionmaking process. It also is
essential to creating and maintaining public trust, an element so crucial
to the acceptability and ultimate effectiveness of public health laws as
346
well as the general legitimacy of future policymaking. Public health
policies may be particularly susceptible to backlashin the form of lack
of public support, legal challenges, noncompliance, or opposition to
347
future lawsif they are coercive. Policymakers should appreciate that
different social groups may view public health laws from different
348
perspectives and endeavor to gain diverse support. In pluralistic
societies, where there is reasonable disagreement about principles that
ought to guide priority setting in meeting population health needs given
limited resources, different viewpoints should be understood and

343.
344.
345.
346.
347.
348.

Ross-Degnan et al., supra note 321.
Pearson et al., supra note 321.
Upshur, supra note 304, at 102; Childress et al., supra note 304, at 173.
Childress et al., supra note 304, at 173; Parmet, supra note 109, at 410.
Parmet, supra note 109, at 410.
Parmet et al., supra note 133, at 654.
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respected, and decisionmaking made as clear and accountable as
349
possible.
PDMP implementation and policies should thus be transparent to
the public. Consideration of various features and program amendments
should be made with the involvement of relevant stakeholders. The
process of effectuating changes to the Massachusetts PDMP provides an
example of excellent public accountability in public health lawmaking. In
August 2012, Massachusetts enacted a law to automatically enroll
practitioners in its existing PDMP and require that they consult the
database when prescribing controlled substances to new patients. The
Commonwealth solicited extensive feedback and held hearings concerning
these changes. Through this process, prescriber objections to the breadth
of circumstances for PDMP checks surfaced and were incorporated into
350
the final implementation rules in the form of mandate exemptions. As a
result, the cooperation and mutual respect between public health officials
and Massachusetts providers was likely strengthened, which will facilitate
future prescription drug misuse prevention endeavors. Prescribers will also
be more willing to accept and comply with the PDMP mandate now in
effect.
Conclusion
This Article seeks to simplify and systematize the inquiries critical
for state policymakers when considering public health lawslike
PDMPsfor implementation. Although various scholars have outlined
factors that should guide policymaking, for instance in the public health
ethics and PHLR literature, this Article is the first to synthesize the
factors under three key criteria relevant to state regulation, suggest the
policymaking junctures at which they should be applied, and apply them
to PDMPs. PDMPs constitute the dominant policy adopted by states to
address prescription opioid misusea profound public health challenge
that is as complex in etiology as in the policy interventions available to
combat it. PDMPs exemplify unstructured policymaking uninformed by
349. Id.; Upshur, supra note 304, at 102; Norman Daniels, Accountability for Reasonableness:
Establishing a Fair Process for Priority Setting Is Easier than Agreeing on Principles, 321 British Med.
J. 1300, 1300 (2000) (outlining key elements of a “fair process” for guiding public health decisions,
including: transparency about the basis of a decision, appeals to common rationales that fair minded
people can accept as relevant to meeting health needs fairly; and procedures for appealing/revising
decisions).
350. Massachusetts Prescription Monitoring Program, Mass. Exec. Office of Health & Human
Servs. (July 2016), https://www.drugabuse.gov/related-topics/trends-http://www.mass.gov/eohhs/gov/lawsregs/dph/proposed-regulations/prescription-monitoring-program.htmlstatistics (last visited Aug. 5, 2016). For
example, the final rule limited mandate coverage to new patient prescriptions for Schedule II/III drugs or
benzodiazepines, and included myriad exceptions, such as: prescriptions to hospice patients, inpatients,
children, or in emergency situations; emergency department practitioners who do not anticipate writing a
Schedule II-V prescription or who prescribe a five-day supply or less; and prescribers who face
circumstances that render PDMP use impossible).
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evidence or systematic guiding principles, and thus would stand to
benefit from a more deliberate and organized path to success. The
framework articulated herein guides PDMP recommendations, but is
also generalizable to public health threats that exhibit characteristics
similar to prescription drug misusenamely, significant public health
problems that can be addressed with a panoply of policy options.
To satisfy legality, effectiveness, and ethical criteriamarkers of
successful public health policymakingPDMPs should follow certain
guidelines. First, they should include strong confidentiality protections
and be searchable by authorized health care practitioners (prescribers
and dispensers) only, to comport with legal and ethical privacy
requirements. Strong penalties for disclosure of information by
authorized users, such as medical license suspensions for prescribers, are
important to provide further confidentiality incentives. Law enforcement
351
officials, licensing boards, and researchers should be provided with the
data on a de-identified basis or pursuant to a court-issued warrant or
352
subpoena. Second, PDMPs should be designed to infringe minimally on
and assist maximally clinical practice. To this end, the data should be as
close to real-time as possible, shared across neighboring states, and
accurate. The databases should be easily searchable and, as soon as
practicable, integrated into electronic medical records. Third, the
programs ought to strongly incentivize prescriber participation, first by
requiring registration and abandoning laws that provide immunity for
failure to check or no obligation to query. Mandates with appropriate
exceptions should be considered once further evidence of existing
mandate efficacy (and possible unintended consequences) becomes
353
available. Fourth, PDMPs should include user guidelines and education
354
about how to use the data effectively. This would help to somewhat
standardize opioid treatments across providers and prevent unintended
consequences, such as under-prescribing for pain and burdening certain
populations based on doctor shopping or diverter stereotypes. Finally,
the existence and features of programs should be publicized to
stakeholders, and any changes to their features going forward should
incorporate diverse perspectives.
PDMPs undoubtedly show promise and should be pursued by the
states, but they are still imperfect laws in need of adjustment and
continued study. Effectiveness research should focus on evaluating

351. Researchers receive data on a de-identified basis in thirty-two states at present. Nat’l All.
for Model State Drug Laws, supra note 68, at 22.
352. See Unger, supra note 223.
353. See Haffajee et al., supra note 70.
354. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention has convened an expert panel to develop
guidelines on opioid prescribing that will be available in 2016. These guidelines should help to develop
additional clinical agreement in the clinical field and may be used to inform PDMP use, once available.
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newer, strong PDMP features (such as mandates) using long-term, multistate designs, when possible, that incorporate comparison groups or
outcomes. Increased evidence linking PDMPs to improved prescribing,
reduced diversion and doctor shopping, and reduced overdoses, in
particular, is needed. Study of the interactive effects of PDMPs and other
prescription drug misuse interventions is also desirable, as these
interventions are often enacted together. Such evidence will further
illuminate PDMP features appropriate for retention and replication.
Incorporation of the recommendations articulated herein and ongoing
re-evaluation of programs are both critical in order for PDMPs to fulfill
their potential to curb the opioid misuse and overdose epidemic in the
United States.
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Appendix Table. Literature Review:
Published Studies of PDMP Effectiveness in Addressing
Opioid Misuse, 1990–2015
Part I. Study Citations and Design Types
Study No. 1. Delcher et al., supra note 297Interrupted time series
with comparison groups.
Study No. 2. Paulozzi et al., supra note 288Multiple parallel time
series, comparing groups without interruption.
Study No. 3. Reifler et al., supra note 290Controlled pre-post.
Study No. 4. Reisman et al., supra note 290Multiple parallel time
series display with controlled pre-post regression analysis.
Study No. 5. Jane E. Brady et al., Prescription Drug Monitoring and
Dispensing of Prescription Opioids, 129 Pub. Health Reps.
139 (2014)Controlled pre-post.
Study No. 6. Paulozzi et al., supra note 288, and see design type above in
Study No. 2.
Study No. 7. Reisman et al., supra note 290, and see design type above
in Study No. 4.
Study No. 8. Rutkow et al., supra note 167Interrupted time series
with comparison group.
Study No. 9. Baehren et al., supra note 295Un-controlled pre-post.
Study No. 10. McAllister et al., supra note 295Un-controlled pre-post.
Study No. 11. Rasubala et al., supra note 302Un-controlled pre-post.
Study No. 12. Ringwalt et al., supra note 295Un-controlled post only.
Study No. 13. Rutkow et al., supra note 167, and see design type above
in Study No. 8.
Study No. 14. Weiner et al., supra note 295Un-controlled pre-post.
Study No. 15. Simoni-Wastila & Qian, supra note 296Cross-sectional.
Study No. 16. Surratt et al., supra note 296Un-controlled pre-post.
The numbers associated with each study listed on this page can be used to
locate the data source, PDMP measure, findings, and methodological
comments related to that study below in Part II of this Appendix Table.
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Part II. Data Sources, PDMP Measures, Findings,
and Methodological Comments
Study
No.

Data
Source

PDMP
Measures

Findings

Methodological
Comments

Primary Outcomes
Opioid-Related Overdoses

1

2

Florida
Medical
Examiners
Commission
drug-related
death data
(2003–2012).

Automation
of Reports
and
Consolidated
Orders
System
(“ARCOS”)
data for drug
distribution
(1997–2005).
National
Center for
Health
Statistics &
CDC drug
overdose
mortality
data (1999–
2005).

Two
measures of
Florida
PDMP:
(1) binary
indicator for
pre- and
post-PDMP;
(2)
continuous
variable for
number of
health
provider
PDMP
queries.

Significant.
Oxycodonecaused mortality
declined 25% in
the month after
PDMP.

National
sample that
characterized
states based
on the
presence at
some time
during the
study period
(19) or total
absence (31)
of a PDMP.

Not significant.
PDMPs not
associated with
lower rates of
opioid overdose
mortality or lower
rates of opioid
consumption.

Strengths: Control for three
concurrent Florida
prescription drug abuse
interventions or cointerventions incorporate
actual provider use of
PDMP into intervention
measure.
Limitations: Effect
observed is dramatic,
particularly given that
PDMP was not mandatory
and use gradually increased
after implementation.
Ability to control for cointerventions using model
chosen is unclear. Limited
generalizability to other
states.

Strengths: Only national
study to assess relationship
between PDMPs and
mortality, using supply as
an intermediary
mechanism.
Limitations: Older study,
conducted when PDMPs
were not very strong.
Combined all states that
had PDMP at any time
during study period into
treatment group. Lacks
before-and-after
comparisons within states.
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Methodological
Comments

Opioid-Related Treatment Admissions & Poisonings

3

Research
Abuse
Diversion &
AddictionRelated
Surveillance
(“RADARS”)

Poison
Center
(2003–2009).

National
sample that
characterized
states based
on the
presence or
absence of a
PDMP, by
quarter.

Significant.
PDMPs were
associated with
lower poison
center intentional
exposures and
lower substance
abuse treatment
admissions.

Strengths: Conducted subanalyses of superior PDMP
features (that is, in effect
for a long time, unsolicited
reports, monitor drugs
through Schedule IV) with
consistent results.

National
sample that
characterized
states based
on the
presence (14)
or absence
(36) of a
PDMP.

Significant.
PDMPs were
associated with
fewer Schedule II
opioid shipments
and fewer opioid
abuse treatment
admissions.

Strengths: National sample
with measures of both
mechanisms (supply) and
health (treatment
admissions).

Not significant.
State PDMPs not
associated with
changes in percapita opioids
dispensed.

Strengths: National sample
with data over a long time
period. Multivariable linear
models adjust for
demographics and
geographic region.

Limitations: RADARS
data are self-reported.

Opioid
treatment
surveillance
data (2003–
2009).

4

ARCOS data
for opioid
shipments
(1997–2003).
Treatment
Episode
Data Set
(“TEDS”)
data for
opioid abuse
admissions
(1997–2003).

Limitations: Outdated.
Imprecise measures of
PDMP laws, which were
generally weak during this
study period.

Secondary Outcomes
Opioid Supply

5

ARCOS data
on opioid
shipments,
quarterly
(1999–2008).

National
sample that
characterized
states based
on presence
or absence of
a PDMP, by
quarter.

Limitations: Effect of
PDMP varied hugely
between states (66%
decrease in Colorado, 61%
increase in Connecticut),
suggesting that
measurement was
imprecise.
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6

(see above)

(see above)

7

(see above)

(see above)

8

9/8/2016 4:34 PM

IMS Health
LifeLink
LRx
prescription
claims data
(July 2010–
Sept. 2012).

Florida
PDMP and
pill mill law
concurrent
implementation.

Findings
Not significant.
PDMPs not
associated with
lower rates of
opioid
consumption.
States with
PDMPs consumed
more
hydrocodone
(Schedule III, less
frequently
monitored),
suggesting
substitution.

Significant.
PDMPs associated
with fewer
Schedule II opioid
shipments.

Significant.
Florida PDMP
and pill mill laws
were associated
with modest
decreases in total
opioid volume
among highest
baseline users.

1691

Methodological
Comments
(see above)

(see above)

Strengths: Excellent data
source and robust methods
used to detect multiple
effects among high
prescribers and users.
Limitations: Comparison
group, Georgia, had
different levels of opioid
use and prescribing at
baseline. Difficult to assess
whether effects are largely
attributable to PDMPs or
pill mill laws (or the
combination). Results have
limited generalizability to
other states.
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Data
Source

PDMP
Measures

Findings

Methodological
Comments

Survey of
University of
Toledo
Medical
Center
Emergency
Department
Physicians
ED, (June–
July 2008).

Ohio PDMP
(“OARRS”)
consultation.

Significant.
Prescribing was
altered in 41% of
cases: 60% of
these cases
resulted in fewer
or no prescription
painkiller being
prescribed due to
the patient’s
number of
previous fills; in
39% of these
cases, physicians
prescribed
painkillers when
they otherwise
would not have.

Strengths: Detailed analysis
demonstrates impact of
PDMP information on a
physician.

PDMP
prescribing
data of
Emergency
Department
physicians of
an urban
tertiary care,
university
teaching
hospital (2week period
in Feb. 2014
vs. 2-week
period in
Dec. 2013).

Florida
PDMP

Not significant.
PDMP data was
not associated
with any change in
average number of
controlled
substances
prescribed per
patient.

Strengths: Conducted
additional survey of
physician impressions of
PDMP data, which
suggested that they felt it
altered their prescribing.

Dental
urgent care
center
electronic
medical
records
(Three
periods:
Pre-PDMP:
Dec. 2012–
Feb. 2013;
Post-PDMP1: Dec. 2013–
Feb. 2014;
Post-PDMP2: Mar.–May
2014).

New York
PDMP
(“I-STOP”)
mandatory
query
implementati
on (applied
to Dentists as
well as other
prescribers).

Significant. The
odds for a patient
to receive opioids
decreased by 58%
in Post-PDMP-1,
and 72% in PostPDMP-2, as
compared to the
Pre-PDMP period
(when adjusting
for differences in
surgical volume
across periods).

Strengths: First study to
investigate mandates. Data
consisted of close chart
reviews and allowed
sufficient time postimplementation to detect
effects.

(“EFORCSE”)

consultation.

Limitations: Small sample
(n=179), limited to Ohio
PDMP, so results have
limited generalizability to
other states. Results subject
to response bias. No
comparison group.

Limitations: Small sample
(n=710 patients), limited to
Florida, so results have
limited generalizability.
“Historical control” not
true comparison group.

Limitations: No
comparison group. More
sophisticated analytical
methods preferred.
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Data
Source

PDMP
Measures

Findings

Methodological
Comments

North
Carolina
PDMP data
(2009–2011,
divided into
6-month
blocks).

Two
measures of
use of North
Carolina’s
PDMP: (1)
number of
providers
who queried
the PDMP;
and (2) mean
number of
days on
which
providers
queried.

(Slightly)
significant.
Slightly positive
association
between increased
use of PDMP and
number of opioid
prescriptions
filled, suggesting
that the PDMP
had no “chilling
effect” on
prescribing.

Strengths: Incorporated
measures of PDMP use into
intervention measures.
Displays time trends.

(see above)

(see above)

Emergency
department
physicians of
patients
presenting in
two academic
medical
centers with
chief
complaint of
back pain,
dental pain,
or headache
(Jun. 2011–
Jan. 2013).

Massachusetts
PDMP
consultation.

Significant.
Florida PDMP
and pill mill laws
associated with
modest decreases
in MME per
transaction and
opioid
prescriptions
(1 year post), but
not changes in
mean days’ supply
per transaction.
Reductions
limited to highest
baseline
prescribers.

Significant. After
PDMP exposure,
emergency
department
physicians
changed plans to
prescribe opioids
in 9.5% cases:
6.5% patients
received opioids
that were not
previously
planned, and 3%
no longer received
opioids.

Limitations: Post-only
study, after PDMP
implementation (2005). No
comparison group.
Registration rates low
(27%), so unlikely PDMP
use explains overall
prescribing trends.

(see above)

Strengths: Careful survey of
physician prescribing plans
before and after consulting
PDMP.
Limitations: Small sample
(n=38) of physicians,
limited to Massachusetts
PDMP, so results have
limited generalizability.
Responses subject to
response bias. No
comparison group.
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Methodological
Comments

Patient Behavior

15

16

Coordination
of Benefits
MarketScan
claims data
of Medicare
eligible and
their
dependents
(2007).

National
sample that
characterized
patient
exposure to
PDMP or not
(2007).

Significant.
PDMPs were
associated with
decreased
utilization of
Schedule II
opioids but an
increase in
Schedule III
opioids, which
were less
frequently
monitored,
suggesting a
substitution effect.

Strengths: Multi-variable
regression analysis using
large sample.

RADARS
System (Jan.
2009–Sept.
2012,
quarterly).

Florida
PDMP and
closely
implemented
prescribing
laws in 2010–
2011 (pill mill
regulations,
limitations
on cash
payments).

Significant.
Decreases in
diversion observed
for three Schedule
II opioid
substances
(methadone,
morphine, and
oxycodone), but
not observed for a
fourth Schedule II
opioid
(hydrocodone).

Strengths: Sophisticated
multi-level models adopted.

Limitations: Medicare
population results not
generalizable to other age
groups. PDMPs not
characterized by the
strength of features. Crosssectional design shows
association only.

Limitations: Diversion
reports could have
exhibited reporting bias.
Difficult to disentangle
PDMP from other related
laws. No comparison group.

For the strongest studies, see all studies cited in bold print.

